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This study addresses the transnational political relationship ofthe Ethiopian
Diaspora in the United States with the homeland, Ethiopia, since the 1990s. It does so by
investigating what the motivating factors and the methods of political participation are, if
any. To this end, a four-part bilingual (Amharic/English) online and hard copy survey
with open and close-ended questions was used. Over 300 members of the Ethiopian
Diaspora in the United States completed the survey, which is the basis of the observations
made in the dissertation. The Ethiopian Diaspora is considered to be a newer Diaspora;
however, the number of Ethiopians living abroad has significantly increased since the
1970s. The research confirms these Ethiopians demonstrate their affinity and connection
to the homeland through social cultural events such as sporting events, attending religious
services, concerts and festivals, and even by traveling frequently to Ethiopia, thus
celebrating their connection to the homeland.
The research also shows that although Ethiopians have a very strong interest in
seeing a better Ethiopia, a majority do not seem to be motivated enough to participate in
transnational political activities. This is due to their mistrust of the political leadership
and the absence of the lack of a democratic culture within the Ethiopian Diaspora. The
few that are motivated to participate are focused more on peripheral activities or methods
ofpolitical participation.
According to the findings ofthis research, factors such as class, gender, age,
immigration generation, and education are not central in determining the individual
political participation ofthe respondents. Most of the respondents are also opposed to an
armed struggle and believe in peaceful methods of struggle to bring meaningful change in
the Ethiopian political system.
Although the legal and political framework in the United States is conducive for
political activism, power struggle and internal disunity have contributed to the minimal
level of engagement ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora. The Diaspora has a huge potential and
capacity to become an important transnational force and a catalyst for change. Future
research may shed light on how to mobilize this untapped force.
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This study provides a systematic overview ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora in the
United States regarding the motives and methods of participation in the political process
in Ethiopia. In an era in which globalization and the ease oftransportation ofpeople,
movements and ideas have encouraged transnational systems and Diaspora phenomena,
the increasing number of Ethiopians in the United States can prove to be a major force in
the domestic political process in Ethiopia. Therefore, such a study is relevant and timely.
Much of the attention of research has been concentrated on the economic
remittances of the Diaspora. Little research has been conducted on the role ofthe
Ethiopian Diaspora towards the political process in Ethiopia. This research, therefore,
attempts to study the motivation and methods of engagement ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora in
the United States.
The Diaspora and the different organizations in the Diaspora are removed from
the domestic political arena and might be far away from the reality on the ground.
However, they have a comparative advantage in terms of political space because they are
operating away from the limitations and constraints imposed on political activity by the
homeland state. They also have the financial resources of the Diaspora that they can tap
into if they manage to mobilize successfully Ethiopians towards their goal. In view of the
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increased importance of the study oftransnational activities, studying their role and
impact will be timely and appropriate.
The importance ascribed by home governments to ethnic communities abroad also
well confirms the importance oftransnational activities and the need for further empirical
research in the area. The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a department solely
responsible for dealing with Ethiopians living abroad. It is used to create dialog with
Ethiopians living abroad and gather support for the government. The Ethiopian Embassy
in Washington, DC is actively engaged in garnering support for the government, in line
with the government's policy aimed at engaging the Diaspora. It has also been alleged
that the government has been allocating large sums of money to establish radio and
television stations that would present themselves as independent media.l Moreover,
when splits within the core Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
group known as the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) occurred, both factions
within the TPLF sent high-level delegations to influence the Diaspora and garner support.
Leaders of the opposition groups also regularly visit Diaspora communities in the United
States to solicit support.
Rapid developments of air travel and communication technologies have also made
transnational activities more intense and frequent. Ethiopian Airlines flies from Addis
Ababa to Washington, DC five to six days a week. Toronto is the second destination in
North America served by the Ethiopian Airlines. Telecommunications (from telephones
and faxes through the internet and satellite television (TV) have made contact between
1. Andinet U.S.A., "Pro-EPRDF TV and Radio Will Be Established in the U.S. to Challenge
ESAT," http://www.andinetusa.org/archives/15891 (accessed October 5,2013).
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Diaspora and their homeland easier and cheaper. Currently, community businesses are
selling a satellite dish for a one-time fee of $300 that will allow TV viewers' access to
Ethiopian TV programs live.
Some groups in the Diaspora have also launched websites, satellite, online TV
and radio programs. Established in 2010, Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) is one
example of these recent developments in the Diaspora. Ethiopians now can tune in and
streamline radio programs from Addis Ababa on their smart phones. Sheger 102.1 FM is
one of the stations that airs its radio program to most parts of the world.
Despite an increased interest in Diaspora transnational activities, it is surprising
that little empirical research has actually been conducted on the topic, especially from the
perspective ofnewer African migrant communities in general and Ethiopians in
particular.2 Experts in history, anthropology, sociology, and economics have presented
general and specific research on such topics. They focused on the main characteristics
and organizational structure ofhistorical and contemporary major Diaspora groups in the
world, and how their relationships with their homelands and host society might develop.
In addition, studies of Diaspora groups in the United States have focused primarily on
these larger and well-established groups, with a longer history of immigration to the
United States, such as Europeans, Jews, Asians, and Cubans. Emphasizing the need for
more work on transnational political activities, Yossi Shain explains,
Studies ofpolitical behavior, international politics and political theory have
almost totally disregarded the significance of exile political activity. Scholarly
works on the relations between governments and political opposition for
2. Helina Meri, "The Ethiopian Diaspora's Participation in Ethiopian Politics" (master's thesis,
University of Cape Town, 2006), 12; Emmanuel Akyeompong, "Africans in the Diaspora: The Diaspora
and Africa," African Affairs 99, no. 395 (2000): 183-215.
example seldom mention it. Similarly, theorists of the nation-state customarily
omit political exiles from their discussions, considering those who operate
outside the state's territorial boundaries (the unit oftheir analysis) to be
irrelevant to their studies. No doubt, one of the reasons for this omission is the
fact that political science tends to distinguish between national and
international politics whereas exile political activity cuts across both domains.3
A study of such transnational activities will,
1. Enrich our understanding ofpolitical interaction between the government in
Ethiopia and opposition groups, as well as supporters in the Diaspora in
particular and other African governments and their respective relationship
with their Diaspora;
2. Provide an idea about the role groups in a host country can play in shaping the
character ofpolitics in the sending country.
3. Explain what impact the home country can also have on the Diaspora
community abroad; and
4. Explain the role that Diaspora groups can play in affecting the foreign policy
ofthe host country.
Political leaders and organizers could also benefit from the finding ofthis study by using
it to design a better strategy for mobilizing the Diaspora towards supporting their
objective. Therefore, such a study will have a substantial set of research outcomes that
will add to the body of literature.
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
The purpose ofthis study is to identify and understand the motivation and
methods of engagement of the Ethiopian Diaspora in the political process in Ethiopia.
The primary research question that this study attempts to address is,
3. Yossi Shain, "Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 109, no.
5 (Winter, 1994-1995): 811-841.
RQ1: What motivates members ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora whether to
participate or not participate in the politics oftheir homeland?
The answer to this question, however, directs us to more questions.
RQ2: What segments ofthe Diaspora are politically engaged?
RQ3: What are the methods of engagement?
RQ 4: Do migration patterns, duration of stay, gender, education, ethnicity,
religion, and income play a role in their political participation?
RQ5: What segments of the Diaspora are not politically engaged?
RQ6: What are the reasons for their disengagement?
Through this study, the purpose is to achieve the following objectives: (1) to determine
what type of role the Ethiopian Diaspora can play in the political process in the home
country, (2) to identify some ofthe methods of engagement, and (3) finally to make a
contribution to the body of literature about transnational politics.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Political History of Ethiopia
Ethiopia is an ancient country located in the northeastern part of Africa, also
known as the horn of Africa. Ethiopia is bordered by Eritrea in the north and northeast,
Kenya in the south, Somalia in the southeast, and Djibouti in the east and Sudan in the
west. It is also a nation built over a long period out of the aggregation of different
peoples at different times.
Ethiopia is Africa's most populous country after Nigeria. The country's
population is mostly Coptic Orthodox Christian, followed by Muslims and by other
Christian denominations. It is also ethnically diverse, with the Oromo as the largest
ethnic group followed by the Amhara, Somali, Tigre, Sidama, Gurage, Welaita, Hadiya,
Affar, Gamo, and Gedeo.1 The Tigre, a minority ethnic group, also makes up the core in
the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which is the current
ruling party in the Ethiopian Government. Further subdivisions within these different
ethnic groups make Ethiopia one of Africa's diverse and multi-ethnic countries.
The history of Ethiopia stretches back to antiquity, with references to Ethiopia in
the Bible. Typically, Ethiopian history began with the visit of the Queen of Sheba from
1. World Fact Book CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/ethtml (accessed December 26,2013).
Ethiopia, to Solomon, king of Israel, in the tenth century BC; hence, the reference to
Ethiopia's three thousand years of history.2 Aside from this,, archeological findings have
demonstrated that the history of Ethiopia dates back to antiquity.
More recent history of Ethiopia illustrates an effort to centralize power, which
was initiated by Emperor Theodros II and Yohannes IV. This process was significantly
expanded by Menelik II, who managed to not only bring the northern and central part of
Ethiopia together but also expand to the south and incorporate territories into Ethiopia.
Menelik's empire building effort culminated in the defeat of Italy's attempt at
colonization at the battle ofAdowa in 1896.
However, the process that led to the Ethiopian state is subject to different
historical interpretation. For some, Ethiopia is a cohesive entity, a state that mobilizes
members of diverse ethnic groups and regions on behalf of their national homeland.3
But it is also considered by others as a creation of wars of expansion and conquest.4
However diverse the viewpoints on Ethiopian history are, there is a crucial
assumption shared by all corners. Ethiopia is essentially made up of different ethnic
groups and the history of Ethiopia is the history of the interaction among these groups.
The diversity has a direct impact on the political history of the Ethiopia oftoday. The
Amhara, the Oromo, and the Tigre were major players in the power rivalry, which led to
2. Bahiru Zewde, A History ofModern Ethiopia, 1855-1991,2nd ed. (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia:
Addis Ababa University Press, 2001), 259.
3. Donald N. Levine, "Reconfiguring the Ethiopian Nation in a Global Era," International Journal
ofEthiopian Studies 1, no. 2 (Winter/Spring, 2004): 1-15.
4. Merara Gudina, Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Questfor Democracy,
1960-2000 (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Chamber Printing House, 2003), 57-63; Mekuria Bulcha, The Making
ofthe Oromo Diaspora: A Historical Sociology ofForced Migration (Minneapolis, MN: Kirk House,
2002), 51-85.
8
the consolidation ofthe Ethiopian state under Menelik, but the partners in the new
multiethnic state were not viewing themselves as equals. The consolidation of the
empire-state correspondingly evoked an ethnic elite competition and conflict in a far
larger multi-ethnic polity.5
The Amhara inhabiting present day Gondar, Gojam, Shoa, and Wello speak
Amharic that is the official language of Ethiopia.1 Since the beginning ofwhat is called
the restored Solomonid Dynasty (1270), it is alleged that all the emperors of Ethiopia
have been Amhara; the exception was Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-1879).6 For those
that conjecture that the Amhara dominated in the political and cultural terms. Politically,
Amhara monarchy lasted for a long time. Culturally, Amharic was spread throughout
Ethiopia by officials and soldiers that were part of the expansion process. Amharic was
the lingua franca also used in schools and government offices. Therefore, it is argued
that this process of expansion and consolidation created a dominant national identity
based on Amhara political power and cultural domination. Hence, Ethiopia is a country
with a large number of ethnic groups where one of these groups has imposed its rule and
language over the rest and has preserved indigenous institutions, elites, and culture
patterns for a long period oftime.7
On the other hand, the notion that the Amhara ethnic group as a whole has held a
monopoly on political and economic power and benefited from these processes is
5. Gudina, Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms, 58-59.
6. Donald N. Levine, Wax and Gold: Tradition andInnovation in Ethiopian Culture (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 2-6.
7. Levine, Reconfiguring the Ethiopian Nation, 1-12.
critically opposed. Scholars examine and posit a counter argument that the notion of
Amhara dominance is a myth that has led to mistaken redistributive policies that have
failed to mitigate socioeconomic disparities.
Regardless ofthe contrasting views, the overwhelming majority ofthe Amharas
are no different from the rest ofthe Ethiopian population; they live in extreme poverty.
On the other hand, the notion ofAmhara dominance has been used as ajustification for
the formation ofmost of the political groups that claimed to fight for their respective
ethnic groups. The Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF), and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) are some ofthe groups
that are cited here for embarking on a struggle ranging from asserting equality within the
Ethiopian context to attempting independence from Amhara dominance and forming their
own statehood.
Alongside Haiti and Liberia, Ethiopia maintained her status as one ofthe three
historical independent black nations of the modern era.9 Except for a five-year
occupation by Italy, Ethiopia successfully defended herself against European
colonization. Despite this view of independence, external forces have played and
continue to play a significant role in shaping every aspect ofthe Ethiopian polity.
However, the critical role external forces play seems not to be given due recognition in
the literature.
8. Kassahun Woldemariam, Myths and Realities in the Distribution ofSocioeconomic Resources
and Political Power in Ethiopia (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006), 1-21; Tefera Haile-
Selassie, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1991: From a Monarchial Autocracy to a Military Oligarchy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 70-71.
9. Saheed A. Adejumobi, The History ofEthiopia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007), 39.
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The boundaries of Ethiopia were significantly shaped by external forces, without
any regard to the people on the ground. The delimitations of the boundaries between
Ethiopia and the surrounding colonies were dictated mainly by the colonial powers.
These demarcation agreements concluded over a period of about a decade with the
British, the French and the Italians were significant in determining the economic, social
and political history of Ethiopia.
The modern Ethiopian nation to a certain extent may not be considered as a
creation of European colonial powers. However, it has definitely been impacted by the
actions ofthe major imperialist and colonial powers as well. The British and later the
Egyptians were eager to control the source ofthe Nile and the country's strategic location
on the Red Sea. This became a major factor in terms of the geopolitics of the region.
Although Italy's attempt to participate in the scramble was forcefully repulsed by
Ethiopia, one cannot deny for instance the lasting influence of the colonial powers'
presence near Ethiopia. In the north, Eritrea was under colonial control for a
considerable length oftime. Its unification with Ethiopia and the ensuing struggle for
independence has greatly shaped the political, economic, and social life ofthe region and
the country at large.
Both Emperor Menelik and Haile-Selassie attempted to establish the legitimacy of
Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea in the international community. Although there is no
consensus as to why Emperor Menelik accepted Italian hegemony over Eritrea after the
Battle ofAdowa in 1896, Eritrea remained under Italian control until the Italians were
defeated by the British during the Second World War. The British maintained control
11
over Eritrea until the United Nations (UN) was involved to study and resolve the Eritrean
issue. During the British occupation, Haile-Selassie strongly worked to influence the
final outcome by lobbying Unionist groups in Eritrea while persuading the United States
and other members ofthe international community to support him in reuniting Eritrea
with Ethiopia.10 His efforts eventually paid off, and Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia
in 1952. Gradually, the autonomy of Eritrea that was initially put in place by the
referendum was dismantled and Eritrea's status was reduced to an administrative unit
within Ethiopia. Radical Eritrean opposition to the incorporation led to the establishment
of liberation groups. Leaders of the Eritrean nationalist groups asserting that Eritrea had
never been part of Ethiopia began forming organizations to fight the repudiation of the
federation. In 1961, the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELF) was founded in Cairo,
Egypt.!' Internal disputes within the ELF led to its fragmentation and the founding of
other groups such as the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). These groups, by
waging guerilla campaigns, became a serious threat to the regime.
The boundary in the east was also another source ofwar and protracted conflict
with Somalia. Ever since its independence in 1961, Somalia's irredentist aspirations had
the vision of creating and unifying greater Somalia encompassing Somalia, Djibouti, the
Ogaden of Ethiopia, and the North Eastern province of Kenya. The pursuit ofthis goal
has led to conflict with Somalia and Ethiopia resulting in two major wars in 1963 and
1978, as well as to a continuous insurrection in support of insurgents on both sides. The
10. Zewde Retta, The Government ofHaile Selassie (1930-1955), Amharic Edition, Daryaganj,
New Delhi: Laxmi Publications, 2012), 285.
11. Adejumobi, The History ofEthiopia, 110.
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Ethiopian government was actively arming and supporting groups opposed to President
Siad Barre of Somalia. The Isaaq clans of northwestern Somalia that resented what they
perceived as their inadequate representation in Siad Barre's government formed the
Somali National Movement (SNM).12 The SNM headquartered in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia,
launched guerrilla raids into the regions of Somalia. Like the SNM, the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front (SSDF) was also dedicated to ousting the Bare regime from Ethiopia;
Somalia, on the other hand, was supporting rebel groups from Ethiopia such as the
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a separatist rebel group fighting in eastern
Ethiopia to create an independent state.13 The WSLF played a major role in the Ogaden
war of 1977-78 assisting the invading Somali army. TPLF leaders were known to use
Somalia passports while traveling abroad, while the EPLF was strongly supported by the
regime in Somalia to gain the support of the Arab League.
Adding to the impediment, Ethiopia's economy is largely dependent on
agriculture. The majority of its population's means of livelihood is agriculture. Most of
her export earnings come from export of agricultural commodities, most notably coffee,
hides and skins, pulses, and oil seeds. The most important imports tend to be machinery,
manufactured goods, petroleum products, and chemicals. Its economy tied to the global
economic system has been experiencing a worsening deficit that fluctuated according to
the price of commodities like coffee and oil seed on the world market. In many respects,
Ethiopia's dependence on the world market continued to play a major role in
12. Somali National Movement (SNM), http://www.mongabay.com/history/somalia/somalia-
opposition.movements.html (accessed December 21,2013).
13. Ibid.
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undermining its effort to achieve a stable polity. Ethiopia, like any other developing
country in the region, faced a major structural problem in its effort to industrialize and
develop. The declining price of export commodities and the rising price of imports both
undermined the state's economic foundation for growth, hi view ofthese facts, it is
important to identify and discuss the internal and external forces as a background to
understand the political, economic, and social factors that led to the creation of the
Ethiopian Diaspora.
The Monarchy
Emperor Haile-Selassie, king of kings, an emperor who claimed descent from the
3,000-year-old dynasty of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon, was not the immediate
successor ofEmperor Menelik. The chosen heir to the throne was Menelik's grandson,
Lij Iyasu. Iyasu, was overthrown after only three years' reign by the Shoan aristocracy
and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church that suspected his loyalties to the state religion.
What came next was a diarchic rule with Menelik's daughter, Zawditu, crowned queen of
Ethiopia, but with Ras Tafari donning the mantle of regent with full political power.14
This led to an opportunity for Ras Tafari, later Emperor Haile-Selassie, to realize his
ambitions by gradually consolidating his power and ascending to the throne. He attained
the height ofhis ambition at the date ofhis coronation as Negusa Negast (King of Kings)
on November 2,1930.15
14. Paulos Milkias, Haile-Selassie, Western Education and Political Revolution in Ethiopia
(Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 2006), 104-105.
15. Bahiru Zewde, A History ofModern Ethiopia 1855-1991 (2nd ed.), (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia:
Addis Ababa University Press, 1991), 140-141.
14
In addition to his success in having Ethiopia accepted as a member of the League
ofNations, Emperor Haile-Selassie contributed a lot in terms of modernizing Ethiopia,
while centralizing his power base. Within one year of his coronation a constitution was
introduced for the first time." This constitution was based on the Meiji Constitution of
Japan, a country that most educated Ethiopians considered a model because of its
successful adaptation of Western learning and technology to the framework of a non-
Western culture.16 A few months later, the anniversary of the emperor's own coronation,
Haile-Selassie convened the first parliament under the new constitution. The parliament
was made up oftwo houses, a Senate, and a Chamber of Deputies. The emperor
appointed members ofthe Senate, while the deputies were also nominated by the nobility
until the people were in a position to elect representatives.17 With the defeat of the
Italians and after the restoration ofpower, the Chamber of deputies was double its pre
war size and its members were elected at the provincial level.18 All power over central
and local government, the legislature, the judiciary, and the military was vested in the
emperor. The constitution was essentially an effort to provide a legal basis for replacing
the traditional provincial rulers with appointees loyal to the emperor, while the
parliament was designed to rubber stamp the emperor's decision.19 The emperor
remained as the sovereign authority.
16. Zewde, A History of'Modern Ethiopia, 128-137.
17. Saheed A. Adejumobi, The History ofEthiopia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007),
54-55.
18. Haile-Selassie, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1991,37.
19. Ibid.
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Emperor Haile-Selassie's contribution cannot be complete without a look at his
foreign policy. He played a significant role in having Ethiopia accepted as an
independent state in the international community of nations by making his country a
member of the League ofNations. His belief in the international system was shaken
when Italy, a member of the League invaded Ethiopia. After the restoration of
independence he had again made Ethiopia a founding member of the United Nations,
when it was founded after the Second World War.
Ethiopia's experience in World War II appeared to have further convinced
Emperor Haile-Selassie ofthe reality of facing a global political arena in which there was
no permanent friends or foes, but only permanent interests. Worried by British attempts
to control Ethiopia, he sought to establish a relationship with the then emerging global
power, the United States. In the ensuing period, Ethiopia signed a mutual defense pact
with the United States. Ethiopia also began receiving military and economic aid from the
United States while in return it made available the use of a military communication base
that served as a link to worldwide American communication in the newly federated
Eritrea. Ethiopia also received aid from India, Sweden, Israel, and the Soviet Union.
Haile-Selassie allied himself with the Western powers but he also sought a degree of
autonomy by creating a relationship with the East as well as with nonaligned movement.
The emperor was also actively involved in the decolonization process of Africa. He
made significant contribution to the creation of the Organization of African Unity by
bridging the gap between the Monrovia and Casablanca blocs. His international role had
earned him and Ethiopia more prestige and respect.
16
Apart from creating a modern bureaucracy and positioning Ethiopia in world
politics, Haile-Selassie played a significant role in creating modern educational
institutions and sponsored hundreds ofyoung Ethiopians to go abroad and get foreign
education. Ironically, it is this group ofyoung Ethiopians educated abroad that play a
major role in the undoing of his empire.
On the domestic scene, Emperor Haile-Selassie's effort to modernize the country
would eventually begin to show in every aspect. The pillars of the Ethiopian polity, the
monarchy, the church and the nobility, gradually lost their influence in the wake of
structural changes in the society.20 The bureaucracy and the army that replaced the
traditional power structure were filled with more and more educated and enlightened
individuals. These forces were placing new demands and expectations in the spirit of
responding to the country's economic, social and political problems. However, the
regime failed to introduce timely reforms that would address the new realities.
The Attempted Coup D'etat of 1960
The abortive coup d'etat of 1960 was instigated by Germame Neway, a graduate
from Colombia University in the United States. On launching the coup, Germame sought
the assistance of his brother General Mengistu Neway of the Imperial Bodyguard.
Germame was the moving spirit behind the attempted coup. His exposure to the
developed world and his education contributed to his activism. According to Zewde,
Germame was president ofthe Ethiopian Student Association in America. On
his return he was elected president of the clandestine alumni association of his
former school. His record as a civil servant was one of a high sense of civic
20. Ibid.
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responsibility and concern for the under-privileged. This made him suspect in
the eyes ofthe regime, and he was exiled to distant administrative posts, first
Walayta then Jijiga. He converted these exile posts into stations
experimenting in equitable administration.21
Germame was also supported by other rebel intellectuals who were the product of
modern education as well as some of the leaders in the military. The military officers,
some members of the security apparatus, the police force, and some civilian elites
became not only aware ofthe need for change but also decided to replace the regime with
a more democratic form of government. The coup was launched while Haile-Selassie
was on a state visit to Brazil. Despite its failure, the coup represented the most serious
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challenge to his power; it also marked a watershed in the history of political opposition.
In addition, most writers agree that the coup leaders were convinced ofthe backwardness
oftheir country and the need to introduce change; however, their attempt was poorly
organized and started in haste.1" Richard Greenfield argued "any conspirators that
decides that a change in the government was a political necessity and that a coup d'etat is
the appropriate means of effecting it must consider wherein lies the strength ofthe
existing regime."23 According to this writer, the three weaknesses that led to the failure
ofthe coup were:
1. The person ofthe emperor dominated the Ethiopian Government and for the
coup to be successful he had to be killed or secured.
2. The Imperial family, the nobility and the ministers were not apprehended and
immobilized by a swift blow.
21. Zewde, A History ofModern Ethiopia, 211-213.
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3. Beside the monarchy, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had a significant
influence and the person ofthe Patriarch, should have been secured.
The coup also failed because ofthe loyalty of the army to the crown and lack of visible
popular support. The university students in Addis Ababa demonstrated in support ofthe
coup. From that time on, students remained critical ofthe regime and demanded a
change in the system. However, the coup organizers neglected the armed forces and the
air force; soon they found themselves confronting the united might of the army and the
air force.24 The leader ofthe Ethiopian Orthodox church, the patriarch, also brought in
the weight of tradition, supporting the loyalists by excommunicating the coup leaders.
The Americans after weighing the situation sided with the emperor.lv As a result, the
coup attempt ended with the concerted effort ofthe forces that lined up in support of the
emperor.
The emperor was able to reassert his authority after a brief period of loss of
power. Even after an attempt of the overthrow of his government, he failed to admit the
defects ofthe administration. He dismissed the coup as an attempt of few misguided
individuals for personal ambition and lust for power.
The post-coup government was not different in its policies and programs from
those prior to the coup. The government still remained a one-man show without any
meaningful devolution ofpower to the local level. All decisions, be they political or
economic, had to have the advance approval of the emperor. Marcus commented that the
coup,
Would not cause the slightest deviation from the path of progress he had
initiated for his country. He was convinced that the programmes he had
24. Zewde, A History ofModern Ethiopia, 214.
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initiated were those best calculated to secure achievement and progress ...
and he was determined to use them with all the vigor and energy at his
disposal. There would be no change of government and the government
programmes.25
On the other side, although the coup failed, it engendered an increased political dissent
especially from those who decried the absence of meaningful political and economic
reform. The wind of change ignited by the leaders was not extinguished with their
physical elimination. To the contrary, it led to a more out spoken and radical opposition
to the regime.
The 1974 Revolution
Several observers of Ethiopian political history have identified the attempted coup
as a watershed. It was the year that the specter of a revolution first became apparent and
the year that the vulnerabilities ofthe empire were laid bare for all to see.26 In the
ensuing period, protests from the student groups, ethnic groups, the peasantry and labor
started growing leading to the downfall of the empire. The issues that formed the basis
for these protests were the need for land and tax reform, administrative decentralization,
and the establishment of a genuine parliamentary democracy.
Apart from the long-range accumulated issues, the following developments were
immediate causes for the revolutionary uprising. Following the increase in oil price by
OPEC, the government raised the cost ofpetrol leading to taxi drivers' protest. The
25. Harold G. Marcus, A History ofEthiopia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1994), 23.
26. Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to Republic (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1988), 69.
27. Ibid.
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fourth army division in the towns ofNegale and Dolo, located in the southwestern part of
Ethiopia, mutinied and detained their superiors complaining about their living conditions.
Teachers went on strike, demanding salary increase and suspension ofthe Education
Sector review policy jointly produced by the government and the World Bank, and the
famine in Wollo.
By the end ofthe 1960s, the student population numbered some 700,000 young
people.28 The government was expanding the number of educational facilities. In
addition to those opened by the government, a number of schools were sponsored and run
by missionaries and private individuals. Of the secondary schools opened by the
government, two were to attain national importance because they became the main
producers ofthe country's political elites in power as well as in opposition.29
Higher education in Ethiopia began with the founding ofthe University College
ofAddis Ababa in 1950. A few years later, the Building College and Engineering
College in Addis Ababa, the Agricultural College in Harar, and the Public Health College
in Gondar opened. The various colleges and faculties were integrated in Haile-Selassie
University in 1961. According to Bahiru,
The Ethiopian student movement had two distinct components—the external and
internal—to which both objective and subjective factors contributed. The
country's worsening situation, specifically the deteriorating condition ofthe
peasantry and the urban masses provided the objective basis of the radical
motivation. On the subjective level, various factors worked on the students to
give them a sharper perception oftheir society and a more radical formulation of
their ideas of changing Ethiopia.30




In 1958 at the Conference of Independent African Countries held in Ghana,
Emperor Haile Sellassie offered 200 scholarships for college studies in Ethiopia.31 In the
ensuing period the advent of scholarship students from other countries in Africa, namely
from British colonies, from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana
became part of the student body. These students brought with them a culture of political
activism, which triggered student radicalism and had a clearly invigorating effect on
Ethiopian university students.32 The Ethiopian Student Movement also had another
important external component.
The student movement, which lacked political consciousness, drastically changed
in outlook. The contact with overseas Ethiopian Students' also broadened their views
and enabled them to articulate their demands. The Ethiopian Student Union in North
America (ESUNA) and the Ethiopian Student Union in Europe played a significant role
in this respect. Finally, the Ethiopian University Service (EUS) was initiated in 1964 to
give university students the opportunity to spend time in the countryside, mainly teaching
in secondary schools. The EUS served as a bridge between campus and society, bringing
students into direct contact with the people whose life they wanted to change, while
providing a medium for closer relation between university and high school students.
The early phase ofthe students' movement was characterized by a struggle for free press
and free union. The attempted coup of 1960 came at this early phase of development and
31. Randi Ronning Balsvik, Haile-Selassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to
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the students began to respond by openly voicing resentment and dissatisfaction with the
regime for the first time, hi the ensuing period, the movement grew into a radical
opposition as well as the beginning ofthe acceptance of Marxist ideas manifested in their
writing, debates and demonstrations. The challenge posed by the students became a
nuisance to the government. Instead of introducing change, the government continued
repressive measures to contain the students' riots, which was aimed at political and social
change. According to Elena Ruyter,
In 1964 students rallied around the issue of land tenure, and in 1964 and 1965
they held large demonstrations under the slogan "Land to the Tiller!" which called
for a redistribution of land from wealthy landlords to working class tenants.
Despite the students' protests and pressures, the regime did not budge on the issue
and created a law banning student organizations, unions, and demonstrations.
Some students were even expelled from the university and others were
imprisoned and their leaders killed, while their publication and union was
banned.34
The repressive atmosphere eventually forced many activists to flee the country, swellmg
the student opposition abroad, particularly in North America.35
Along with the growth of the bureaucracy and the army, the economic sector grew
and provided employment opportunity for a wage-earning class, a newcomer in the
Ethiopian social structure.36 Workers were not allowed to form unions. Workers were
underpaid; they were denied the right to organize themselves in defense of their rights.
However, the Labor Relation Decree of 1964, with the sympathetic support of some
enlightened bureaucrats and pressure from the International Labor Organization (ILO),
34. Global Nonviolent Action Database, http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ethiopian-
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was issued.37 In a short time taking advantage ofthe legal environment, trade unions and
labor unions were forming and fighting for better pay and working conditions. The
Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) was also formed in 1962; with a
membership of about 150,000 workers, it had struggled to ensure the rights ofworkers
and had contributed to the eruption ofthe 1974 revolution.38 The CELU served as an
umbrella organization that represented a number of labor unions and employee self-help
associations. The Derg, the military junta that ruled Ethiopia at the time, banned the
organization and replaced it with the All-Ethiopian Trade Union on January 8,1977.39
In spite of the injection of some degree of industrialization, the country was still
agrarian and even of a subsistence nature. The peasant was and still remains the
backbone ofthe Ethiopian economy. The monarchy, the clergy and the nobility all
depended on the efforts ofthe peasantry. The peasant also labored to meet the needs of
the upper class while operating in a primitive environment. Lack ofmodern agricultural
technology and drought coupled with the exploitative relationship, the peasant was put in
a difficult position. As a result, peasants were evicted when they were unable to meet tax
obligations and to deliver the share demanded by the landlord. The disruption in the rural
area led to an influx of poor people into the urban areas. Since the economy in the urban
areas was offering limited opportunity, most of the evicted farmers were forced to leave
in the brink of survival. Those that remained in defiance were also resisting eviction and
the pressure to pay taxes. The incidence as well as the intensity of rebellion were
37. Ibid.
38. Haile-Selassie, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1991,133-134.
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witnessed in the south eastern province of Bale or Somali-inhabited frontier district,
Tigre, and Gojam to name a few.40 These incidents were a struggle waged between two
unequal groups. Armed mostly with spears and swords, the peasants confronted a well-
equipped enemy made up of landlords and government troops. The government failed to
take proper action and was not even prepared to admit the presence of famine in Wollo.
On the ethnic side, Ethiopia is a multiethnic polity that is inhabited by no fewer
than eighty ethnic groups. Each has its own language, culture and customs. The
demographically dominant ethnic groups are the Oromo, Amhara, and the Tigreans.
The monarchy adopted Amharic as the official language for the transaction ofthe
affairs ofthe state. Amharic has been the official language of Ethiopia for several
hundred years. While the adoption of a national language was a sound policy, the
language and cultures of the other groups were disregarded by the monarchy. Although
this reality was considered by some as an evidence ofAmhara superiority, the fact was
under the monarchy all ethnic groups had suffered across the board under the exploitative
arms of feudalism. Amharas, Oromos, Tigrians, and Somalis were victims ofthe system.
As Haile-Selassie argued, "It would be absolutely absurd and unfair to ascribe evils of the
system to one ethnic group on the ground of the presumption that it had dominated the
governance of the state—a view, quite often, expressed by misinformed scholars and
insurgent organizations.
On the other hand, it was a fact that there were social attitudes, which denigrated
ethnic groups including the Amhara. People were subjected to humiliation because of
40. Zewde, A History ofModern Ethiopia, 215-219.
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their ethnic names; physical appearances, cultural experiences and the like. Therefore,
one can assume that the different perspectives on ethnic relations may have led to
different understanding and interpretation of the reality in Ethiopia. This in return has led
to a fragmented atmosphere, distrust at different levels and enmity among the actors in
the political scene.
In addition, the reality in the northern and eastern part of the country was quite
different. The opposition movements in both regions had their origins in their colonial
past. Eritrea is the name given to the northern extreme of Ethiopia, which Italy seized
from Ethiopia from 1869 to 1890 to create a colony in the Horn of Africa. After the
Italians were defeated, the area was under British Military Administration for ten years
until it was federated to Ethiopia. Ultimately, the federal solution sponsored by the big
powers was reluctantly accepted by Ethiopia. The federal arrangement lasted for ten
years and was repudiated on November 1962.42 Eritrea then became part of Ethiopia.
The dissolution of the federation exacerbated a situation that was already volatile.
Consequently, secessionist groups were formed that saw the integration as outright
annexation and stepped up their struggle for separation. The Eritrean Liberation
Movement (ELM) was the first organization that sought to achieve its objective by
political and diplomatic means, including intervention from the United Nations. The
ELM was soon eclipsed by the Muslim-dominated Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),
which was formed by Eritrean exiles in the Middle East. The front had the support and
42. Zewde, A History ofModern Ethiopia, 219.
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assistance of certain Arab governments. Its ambition was to create a Moslem Eritrean
state that would be associated with the Arab League; as events later proved, it was
accorded an observer's status in the Arab League.44 On the other hand, the EPLF was
formed with the objective of opposing the unification of Eritrea to Ethiopia. This group
was dominated by Christian Eritreans.
The ELF and EPLF were not cooperating in furthering their common goal except
for a briefperiod of alliance. In the ensuing period they settled their differences by
resorting to force. Finally, three major separatist groups, the Eritrean Liberation Forces
based in the Barka region, the People's Liberation Forces located in the Red Sea area,
and the Salfi Nasenet Eritrea (Front for Eritrean Independence) established from the
Akala Guzay region, all came together in 1972 to form an alliance constituted as the
EPLF.45 The armed struggle in Eritrea lasted from 1961 to 1991. However before the
struggle culminates in the independence of Eritrea, it became an armed struggle that
sapped the power of the imperial government as well as the military regime.
The international dimension of the conflict was such that, prior to the 1974
Ethiopian revolution the west particularly the United States, was not disposed to support
the cause of the Eritrean fronts. The United States had a military communication base in
Eritrea and was a major ally ofthe emperor. However, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iraq,
Somalia, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) strongly supported the Eritrean
rebellion groups. The weapons that the Ethiopian armies captured from the Eritreans
were of Soviet make and under such circumstances, it was difficult to convince the
44. Haile-Selassie, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1991, 100.
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Ethiopia authorities that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was not
involved in the Eritrean uprising.46 In its attempt to compete with the United States and
the USSR, China was also involved on the side of the rebels in Eritrea, while having a
cordial relationship with Ethiopia. These developments are testimony to the fact that
external forces instigate conflicts for the advancement oftheir strategic goals. Through
arms sales, military advice, technical assistance, and monetary loans, local conflicts
become globalized. On the other side, leaders in Africa were also successful in playing
one power against the other in the process. Although not directly colonized by outside
powers, Ethiopia was and still remains to be influenced by external powers.
Another conflict that continued to shape the politics of Ethiopia is the boundary
dispute with Somalia. Having secured recognition of its claim over the Ogaden through a
series of treaties with Britain, France, and Italy, Ethiopian hegemony in the region
became heightened in the late 1940s and early 1950s.47 Ever since the Somali state came
into being, its irredentist aspirations have led to two major wars with Ethiopia. Somali
nationalism was also nurtured in the Ogaden region further resulting in the formation of
liberation movements and the seeds of territorial conflicts. Furthermore, the conflict has
also been a playground for the super powers in the context of the cold war and to this date
remains to attract international involvement.
These were the realities of pre-revolutionary Ethiopia. The students, the working
class and the intelligentsia cognizant ofthese problems were constantly demanding
46. Daniel Kinde, The Five Dimensions ofthe Eritrean Conflict 1941-2004: Deciphering the
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change. Taffara Deguefe, a prominent banker in his autobiography made the following
observation: "We could see and read that Ethiopia as a long established independent
state was falling behind the rest of Africa's new independent states in progress. We
begun to feel the gradual and isolated reforms were a false substitute for real
transformative change."48
Despite the underlying problems, the government of Haile-Selassie failed to heed
the calls for change and continued to hold on to power. At the end, the final stage of
Ethiopian revolution began in January 1974 with a series of mutinies led by the military
in various provinces and the citizens in Addis Ababa. In what initially started as an urban
phenomenon, students, teachers, civil servants, and soldiers embarked on a rebellion
against the imperial regime, its supporters of nobility and feudal aristocracy, and the
nascent bourgeoisies.49 The overthrow ofthe government and radical change was
advocated despite the absence of a properly organized political party that could assume a
leadership role. This opened up the opportunity for the military to fill the void.
The Military Regime
The committee of soldiers that administered the coup de grace to the tottering
ancient regime in September 1974 went through various phases of development.50 At
first, the Derg (Committee) proclaimed that its presence in the process was temporary and
only to preserve peace and stability. It also vowed to return to its barracks once a civilian
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government was put in place. The Derg's first act was a request to the emperor to declare
a general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, the speedy completion and
implementation ofa constitution and a declaration of its loyalty to the emperor.51
The Derg's next move was to detain a number of high-ranking government
officials and members ofthe aristocracy whom they considered a threat to the
continuation ofthe political change. To rally popular support, the Derg also came up
with a slogan of Ityopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First). As far as the affairs of government
were concerned, dual power prevailed for less than two months. There was a cabinet led
by a Prime minister that was sharing the day-to-day task ofthe government.
Nevertheless, as time passed, power slipped away from the hands ofthe cabinet to the
Derg. Finally, the cabinet was dismissed and the prime minister joined his former
colleagues in detention. He was replaced by Michael Imiru, son of the emperor's
relatively progressive cousin.52
In the formative years the Derg was not yet inclined to Marxism, hi the first few
months of military rule, the Derg also introduced a policy document that proclaimed
Hibrettesebawinet (Ethiopian Socialism), a document that was perceived to be a
historically relevant political response to the crisis based on the objective reality ofthe
country.53 This early outlook did not prevail. Students and the intellectuals were
diligently working to pull the Derg and the country to a radical Marxist path. More
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importantly, two student organizations that emerged in the United States and Europe
were at the forefront ofthe radicalizing process. Both political groups transplanted then-
operation to Ethiopia immediately after the 1974 revolution and offered their
organizational and ideological support to trade unions, civil servants and the Derg itself.
In September, the emperor was deposed by a proclamation issued by the Derg.
According to the proclamation, Emperor Haile-Selassie would be succeeded by Crown
Prince Merid Azmatch Asfa Wossen as soon as he returned from treatment abroad;
parliament was to be closed until elections were held and a new draft constitution would
replace the 1955 constitution.54 According to some historians, regarding the monarchy
there were strong doubts that the Crown Prince would be appointed, it was an empty
promise designed to buy time. Gedamu argued,
One particular incident made that poignantly clear, an extensive television
documentary was aired on the eve ofthe putsch in which heart-breaking scenes
were shown from Wollo famine, mixed together with footage of state banquet
in which members of the royal family and the aristocracy were celebratmg the
emperor's birthday, and the emperor was feeding his pets. Such scenes were
hardly calculated to invite the Crown Prince to hurry back home for his
coronation.55
In the ensuing period, the power struggle within the Derg started claiming its causalities.
The struggle within the Derg between the moderates and the radicals intensified. General
Aman Andom, the Derg's chairman was assassinated. He was accused of suggesting a
negotiated settlement with the Eritrean nationalists. Hardliners in the Derg favored a




immediately fifty-seven ofthe most important political prisoners.56 From this point on,
Mengistu Hailemariam supported by the radical members of the Derg gained the upper
hand and consolidated his power.
Consequently, the Derg laid out its policy priorities that were meant to address the
socioeconomic and political problems. All banks and insurance companies, large-scale
industries came under state control. Then followed the most radical policy move made
by the Derg—the nationalization of all rural land. The immediate result was the abolition
ofthe land tenure system. In one fell swoop the basis of the feudal power was ordered
swept away.57 The Derg followed the rural lands proclamation with the nationalization
of all urban land and houses not physically occupied by owners, whereas the rural land
policy led to the demise ofthe feudal system. The urban land policy was a decided effort
to eliminate the wealth, power, and influence of a growing urban-based indigenous
entrepreneurial class.58
The radical measures taken by the Derg garnered support from the masses. The
leftist underground organizations also realized that the revolution, in spite of their
opposition to the Derg, gathered a momentum and failure to recognize this political fact
was counterproductive.59 Instead of remaining on the side, some of those that survived
the political killing during the Red terror joined the Derg looking for opportunity, while
some joined the rebel groups.
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In the international arena, Ethiopia was isolated by the west due to its inclination
to the eastern bloc. The Eritrean secessionists and the EDU,V with the assistance ofthe
Sudanese government and other Arab countries, had intensified their struggle in the
northern part of the country. Somalia, with the help of the Western Somalia Liberation
Front (WSLF) also took advantage of the internal strife and declared war on Ethiopia to
fulfill its irredentist aspirations. The Carter administration also refused to deliver
armament that was approved while the emperor was in power. On February 25,1977, the
Carter administration announced that because of continued gross violations ofhuman
rights by the governments of Ethiopia, Argentina, and Uruguay, U.S. military aid to those
countries would no longer be available.60 This led to a new friendship, military and
economic assistance and cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries. It also
gave to the Ethiopian leadership a sense of security and confidence to intensify the
revolution.
Once the threat from Somalia was repelled with the assistance of the east, the
Derg turned its attention to the north with a series of campaigns to crush the rebellion.
On the political front, the Derg took a series of steps to create a vanguard party and
transformed itself into a civilian government. The Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE)
became the vanguard Marxist Leninist Party and the Ethiopian revolution was culminated
in the creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). Colonel
Mengistu consolidated his power and became the president and the party chief. The
formation of the party coincided with the tenth anniversary of the coming to power ofthe
Derg. It also took place against a background of another worst drought in the history of
60. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia, 204.
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Ethiopia. As Zewde pointed out, by one of the many ironical twists of history, a regime
that came to power castigating its predecessor for covering up the 1973 famine was
celebrating its ultimate triumph on the threshold of an even more disastrous one.61
After the formation of the PDRE, the conflict in the north intensified. The
government initially took a series ofpeace initiatives with the EPLF, while the insurgents
intensified their offensive on many fronts. In response, the government launched the
"Red Star campaign." The campaign was a plan launched by Mengistu Hailemariam in
Eritrea that had the double objective of rehabilitating the war-damaged economy of the
region and rooting out secessionist groups such as the EPLF. The campaign ultimately
failed leading to a reversal of fortune. The EPLF took the offensive thus gradually
weakening the government.
Meanwhile in Tigrai, another major regional challenge to the Derg was unfolding.
The Tigrean People Liberation Front (TPLF)vi officially launched in the 1970s begun to
play a decisive role that will culminate in the demise of the government in 1991. The
TPLF and the EPLF worked together and participated in some joint operations.
In addition to the groups in the north, one of the groups that emerged to challenge
the Derg was the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which claimed to fight for the liberation
ofthe Oromo people and an Oromo nation-state. This group was also able to wage some
isolated guerilla operations in the southeastern parts of Ethiopia. It also enjoyed
considerable support from the ELF and TPLF.
By the mid 1980s, the Derg seemed to be fighting a losing battle against these
groups and the situation was worsening. Deteriorating morale of the army and the end of
61. Zewde, A History ofModem Ethiopia, 255.
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the Cold War will eventually lead to the collapse ofthe military regime after seventeen
years in power.
In addition to the economic cost, the war was taking its toll. Mismanagement,
indiscipline, corruption, lack of training and communist command and control wrecked
havoc in the military establishment. Several books have been published by former Derg
officials detailing the issues discussed above.62 The decline in morale within the
Ethiopian army led the EPLF and the TPLF to mount successfully an all-out attack.
Captured tanks, rocket launchers, artillery pieces, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and
tons of ammunitions transformed their operations from hit and run guerilla tactics to
conventional engagement, hi 1989, a coup d'etat attempt was staged by a group of
generals. The poorly coordinated coup was foiled within hours. Few ofthe leaders of the
coup committed suicide, while twelve long serving generals and senior officers were
summarily executed at a critical time. From here on, the military entered an almost
irreversible process of implosion.63
In a desperate search for military assistance, Mengistu visited Soviet leader
Gorbachev on his last trip to Russia in 1989. Gorbachev who was in the midst of a major
reorientation of his country advised Mengistu to find a lasting political solution to the
problem instead of engaging in a protracted civil war. The external pressure exerted on
the government to change political orientation and the escalation of domestic problem
forced it to declare a new economic policy and political direction.
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However, this was too little and too late to come as a solution. During the final
hours as the insurgents advanced to the capital city, the United States facilitated
Mengistu's departure to Zimbabwe. According to Getachew,
The State Department's Assistant Secretary for Africa, Herman Cohen, organized
peace talks to take place in London between the government and its adversaries:
the TPLF, EPLF and the OLF. The talks failed and against the opposition ofthe
government delegation, Cohen arranged for TPLF forces to move to Addis
Ababa. The EPLF took control over the administration of Eritrea. The United
States played a significant role in bolstering the rebel groups and was instrumental
in their entry to Addis Ababa. It was also responsible in convening the London
peace conference—that excluded some political organizations and formed the
post-Derg transitional government of Ethiopia.64
The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
In July 1991, the EPRDF called a national conference of almost all opposition
organizations with the goal of establishing a new administrative body. Some of these
were small ethnic parties, newly organized under the EPRDF, and the OLF. Two notable
organizations were not invited: the discredited Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) and
several non-ethnic parties that had united in exile to form the Coalition of Ethiopian
Democratic Forces (COEDF).65 Regardless, the National Conference was viewed as an
encouraging sign that the process was going to be all-inclusive.
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was finally formed made up of
many political organizations, with the EPRDF as the dominant group. The EPRDF's
leader, Meles Zenawi, was elected interim president of the TGE and Tamirat Layne as
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prime minister. Meles's party also retained key positions of Defense and Foreign Affairs,
while the OLF received fewer cabinet posts. The transitional process started witnessing
some tension between the EPRDF and the OLF extending to military clashes. One of the
reasons for the conflict was disagreement over the appropriate size and role ofthe armed
forces of the OLF and the competition between the latter and a component ofthe EPRDF,
namely the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO).66 The two were also
competing for political control over the same area. Eventually, the OLF withdrew from
the election and the TGE.
The new government declared that the source ofpolitical instability was ethnic
inequality and claimed to have prepared the groundwork to respond to the continuing
challenges previous governments have faced. This time the response to the issue of
ethnic nationalism was reorganizing the country as a federal state structured along ethnic
lines. The state recognized the unconditional right of every nation in the country to self-
determination up to and including secession. One can easily witness that this provision
was meant to be applied selectively. The leadership gave sovereign independence to
Eritrea while for instance not entertaining the secession request from the Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF). It was a priceless gift for the separatists since it saved
Eritrea from being treated by the international community like Katanga, Biafra,
Somaliland or Puntland were treated, integral part ofthe countries from which they
wished to secede.67 The decision of the EPRDF government and its leadership to
endorse the independence of Eritrea has forced many to label the government as a traitor.
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The late prime minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi was known to be an ardent political
cadre of Eritrean independence even before TPLF came to power. After overthrowing
the military regime, Meles Zenawi openly declared that there was nothing to be done than
to support the secession of Eritrea in its entirety. Therefore, his critics argue that, he
deployed Ethiopian resources and gave his full time for conduct of the Eritrean
Referendum and continued survival at the expense of Ethiopia.
In June 1992 regional elections were held, but these elections failed to provide the
transitional regime with a popular mandate. The EPRDF's behavior was said to have
failed to provide an atmosphere where free and fair elections could take place. The
EPRDF in control of government institutions and the absence of an independent election
committee resulted in an unfair outcome. In addition, the EPRDF soldiers serving as the
national army were said to be intimidating voters and perpetuating violence.68 The
opposition tried to increase its advantage and find a means to reform the transition by
holding a "Peace and Reconciliation Conference" in Addis Ababa, which was boycotted
by the TGE.69 Another strategy was also to involve the west, particularly the United
States to use its influence to convince the TGE to engage in talks with the objective of
forming a new transitional government that would include all parties before the next
elections. Former President Carter came up with an initiative for another round of talks,
which was declined by Meles Zenawi's government.70
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The next round of elections took place in June 1994 to create a Constituent
Assembly, which was charged with the responsibility of considering, modifying, and
ratifying a draft constitution.71 Although it had problems, observers concluded that
relatively speaking the 1994 election was more improved than the 1992 one. However,
most voters lacked meaningful choice because the main opposition parties did not
participate as a result of the pressure from the government.
In May 1995, regional and national elections were held under the new
constitution. Although the opposition parties declined to participate, critics argue that
this was by far a better election. The National Election Board (NEB) did an impressive
job of delivering ballots and necessary materials to thousands of polling stations and 960
independents competed for both the national and regional elections in 584
constituencies.72 Also by remaining out ofthe elections, the leaders of the opposition
played a central role in helping the EPRDF consolidate its power.
In 2005, two large, strong and very competitive rival coalitions emerged for the
first time to challenge the EPRDF: the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and
the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF). Even as charges and countercharges of
abuse and impropriety flew between the EPRDF and the opposition coalitions, Ethiopians
with access to television were able for the first time to see frank multiparty debates.
There were even two huge peaceful demonstrations, one sponsored by the government
71. Lyons, "Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia," 132.
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and another larger one backed by the opposition. The rallies created an atmosphere of
expectation that real democratic change was coming.
However, once the results ofthe elections started coming in, it became known
that the CUD and the UEDF won most ofthe urban areas and the CUD won the capital
city. The EPRDF lost in every area that was monitored by the European Commission and
the Carter Center and won in the far off rural districts where elections were hard to
monitor.74
The European Union observers characterized the election as being filled with
intimidation, falsification and murder perpetrated by government supporters. CUD
members protested and refused to take seats in a rigged parliament. That opposition
decision to boycott the results and vowing not to participate in parliament was viewed by
some once again as giving the EPRDF the opportunity to consolidate its power. As
Terrence Lyons explains, decisions by the Ethiopian Diaspora in North America and
Europe shaped opposition participation in the May 2005 elections. Although the
EPRDF government must take much of the blame in restricting the political space during
and after the election, the Diaspora in North America must also be held responsible for its
share of damage. It has played a significant role hi the opposition's decision to withdraw
from political participation in the aftermath of the 2005 election.
Acknowledging the loss of the Addis Ababa races to the CUD and citing the need
to maintain order, the government banned demonstrations. The opposition regarded the
74. Milkias, Haile-Selassie, Western Education and Political Revolution in Ethiopia, 277.
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ban as a measure taken by the government to silence the opposition. A massive anti
government demonstration took place in the aftermath ofthe election. The protest had
been marred with violence, with some people killed and thousands incarcerated.
According to Human Rights Watch, the disorder in the capital reached a bloody peak
when security forces responded to incidents of rock throwing and looting by opening fire
indiscriminately on large crowds of people, killing at least 36 and wounding more than
100.76
The leaders ofthe CUD were arrested charged with planning to commit genocide,
crime against humanity and also charged with a "Georgian or Ukrainian style" post
electoral regime change as the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi put it. There were wide
spread condemnations of the actions of the government internationally, mainly from the
EU and the Diaspora. However, the government blamed the EU observers for allegedly
releasing false information to the opposition, leading to the violence and death in Addis
Ababa. The Diaspora was also accused ofpromoting instability. Regarding these
developments, the United States was criticized for giving priority to its short-term foreign
policy. This rather was a misplaced criticism because like any other nation in the world,
the United States foreign policy is diverse and is determined based on its national
interest.
According to Article 54 ofthe 1994 constitution, general elections were to be held
every five years. The opposition parties were encouraged to participate. Human right
groups and political activists were encouraged by the steps towards a democratic
76. Human Rights Watch Database, http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/06/14/ethiopia-crackdown-
spreads-beyond-capital accessed 12/23/2013.
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allowance marked by the restoration of free press and civil society. New monthly
magazines and newspapers emerged. People started to see a ray of hope, but for some
this was taken with a grain of salt. Most critics of the government argued then that the
leaders ofthe new government have as a guiding principle Marxism ofthe Albanian
pedigree.77 However, faced with a new world order and the need to accommodate the
global economic and political realities forced them to build a facade of democracy.
Soon after, the honeymoon came to an end. While the constitution on paper
allows journalists full right to disseminate information, in practice they were not
operating freely. The Ministry of Information was alleged routinely to cancel licenses of
those publications that it claims to have failed to respect their journalistic code of conduct
as well as failing to discharge their responsibilities. As a result, many newspapers closed
shop. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), no fewer than 150
journalists have been jailed since 1992 and at least 16 journalists lost their lives.
Prime Minister Meles, in order not to risk losing the support of donor Western
nations, guaranteed on paper the right of political parties to compete on a level ground.
However, it did not take long for him to go back on the assurance he gave. Political
parties other than the government's EPRDF have routinely been subjected to harassment
and outright attack. Those who somehow succeed to get elected are thrown into jail and
are charged with sham crime. International terrorism is also being used as a pretext to
silence journalists and members of the opposition party. The need for good governance
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and human rights is being sacrificed by the self-serving needs of world political and
economic powers.
Ethiopian politics has now come to full circle. The struggle first against a feudal
regime and then a military dictatorship ended up transformed to a new form of
dictatorship. Also, the transition process that seems to be all inclusive ended up to be a
dictatorship. In this case, therefore, the French adage, "the more things change the more
they stay the same," has proven to be right.79
The 2005 election was viewed as a serious threat to the government's hold on
power. The opposition's unexpected winnings in the election led to a crackdown against
the opposition. During the 2005 elections, the opposition was strongest in Addis Ababa,
the capital: The opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) party won a
landslide victory, winning 137 of the city council's 138 seats.80 However, only three
years later during local and by-elections, the EPRDF won all but one seat at the capital's
district and sub-city administrative level. Consequently, the ruling Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) remained in power at all levels of government
following its absolute victory in federal and regional elections in May 2010. The ruling
party got a 99% majority in Ethiopia's House of People's Representatives, with
opposition candidates winning just two seats.81
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The scale of the victory resulted from the memory of the violent crackdown on
post-election violence in 2005, along with the passage of restrictive laws governing the
media, civil society and political funding. While the government attributed its success to
its policies, critics believe the elections were heavily manipulated. Voter's
disappointment with the opposition, and continual intimidation and harassment are also
possible explanations.
For instance, after the 2010 elections, opposition parties stated that many oftheir
members and candidates had been jailed by the government. A major opposition leader,
Judge Birturkan Mideqsa ofthe United Democratic Justice Party (UDJ) remained in
prison from 2008 through 2010. The government also continued to limit the freedom of
association and assembly. Several opposition parties had difficulty organizing and
recruiting members; they were put in prison. Oromo opposition party candidates were
harassed and put into prison. Several opposition groups and individuals were accused of
plotting to overthrow the government and put in jail.
In January 2009, the EPRDF controlled parliament passed a law that makes it
more difficult for civil society organizations to do any kind of work in the areas of
democracy and human rights.82 The law was criticized to be restrictive and effective in
silencing human right advocates.
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of expression, several journalists
have been sentenced to prison on the basis of "incorrect reporting." The press and other
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media have continued to face serious restrictions, with journalists subject to arrest and
prosecution for alleged defamation. Independent news magazines were forced to close
due to harassment. Other journalists practice self-censorship in order to survive as
professional workers. Those that continue to challenge the government and continued to
write were arrested on accusations of involvement in a terrorism plot. According to the
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), authorities have used sweeping terrorism laws to
detain independent journalists in an attempt to wipe out the few critical voices left in the
country.
The CPJ has also voiced concerns over Ethiopia's increasingly draconian Internet
control, even as the government justifies these measures as a safeguard against telecom
fraud. Ethiopian internet access is limited and controlled by the government. Many sites
reporting on Ethiopian sociopolitical and economic affairs are blocked. Control ofthe
only Internet server has been a prime means of restricting the free flow of information.
Government-sponsored websites propagate EPRDF ideology and justify every EPRDF
action as correct and unquestionable. Media outlets controlled by the EPRDF, such as
the FANA Broadcasting Corporation and the WALTA cable information agencies,
dominate the sector while independent outlets are restricted.
A 2008 media law has had a further restricting effect on freedom of speech.
According to the CPJ, a number of its provisions allow the government to restrict the
independent media, while leaving intact existing repressive statutes that fall well short of
international standards. In particular, the bill allows prosecutors to impound summarily
any print publication deemed a threat to public order or national security. The bill also
83. Ibid.
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increases fines for defamation to 200,000 Birr (approximately U.S. $10,000).84 These
restrictions give the government broader powers to restrict the flow of information.
According to the Ethiopian News and Opinions Database,
Backed both by the United States and China, the government established
Information Network Security Agency (INSA) to safeguard government information
systems from security threats. But it is also used to monitor e-mail
communications, filter opposition websites, jam TV and radio signals and monitor
wire transfers. This may involve hacking the communication of opposition party
leaders and activists living overseas.85
On paper, Ethiopia is formally a constitutional democracy, founded on a modern
constitution with a division of powers, a formally independent judiciary and guarantees
ofhuman rights. In reality, Ethiopia continued to be ruled by an authoritarian
government in which the ruling party uses legal and illegal means to prevent any possible
change of government, let alone a shift of regime.
The government's attempt to suppress opposition voices and intimidate those that
are against its policies is not limited in the domestic arena. When the Ethiopian state
faced political unrest in the aftermath of the 2005 election, it responded by indicting not
only opposition leaders in Addis Ababa, but also Ethiopian-Americans who run
politically influential websites and controlled political campaign funds from abroad.
With the death ofPM Meles Zenawi, there was some degree of expectation that
the government would reconcile with its opponents and begin to work towards a
democratic system of government. However, the EPRDF government showed no sign of
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loosening its grip on power. Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegne's government
continued to pursue these policies with as much, if not more, resolve as before. Despite
some divisions and tensions within the ruling coalition, the EPRDF government remained
in power.
History of Migration and Transnational Activities
Migration from Ethiopia has been a result ofmany factors. Unlike most
developing countries, Ethiopia has no history of colonial ties that could foster migration
(e.g. Algerians in France or Jamaicans in Britain). Rather, in Ethiopia, migration is
nearly always a proactive or reactive response to conditions and developments that
threaten human peace and security.88 These developments could be a result of internal
and external factors. Therefore, a discussion of the basis of Ethiopian migration must
look into the internal as well as external factors.
Before the 1870s, slavery forced Oromo migration to other regions in northeast
Africa, the Middle East and Asia.89 The wars of conquest and consolidation waged
during the regimes ofEmperor Yohannes and Menelik, resulted in the intensification of
slave-raiding and the slave trade. The effort to consolidate the southwestern borders of
Ethiopia has led to the large numbers of refugees being displaced from the area crossing
international borders and settling in neighboring countries. It is also noted that with the
87. Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle, WA: University ofWashington
Press, 1997), 73-98.
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creation of the border and the alternative attraction of the Sudan large number of persons
moved from side to side as the opportunity arose or as the occasion demanded. The
making ofthe Ethiopian empire resulted in the displacement and forced migration of
thousands in the southwestern part of Ethiopia. During the 1890s, Emperor Menelik II
who was known for routing the Italians from Ethiopia was also largely responsible for
expanding Ethiopia's border by conquest in the southwest. Tewodros II initiated,
Yohannes IV elaborated, Menelik II consolidated, and Haile-Selassie I completed the
process of transformation from parcellized sovereignty to centralized sovereignty.91
A look at the recent history of Ethiopia shows evidence of migration and
transnational activities. During the 1920s, very few Ethiopians were able to acquire
modern education by going abroad. These foreign educated elites have made attempts to
organize themselves into a political pressure group.92 They felt that they have a
responsibility to modernize their country. However, after returning, most of them were
killed by the Italian army during the brief occupation period.
Apart from such developments, a significant number of Ethiopians, including the
emperor, have sought refuge in neighboring countries as well as the Middle East and
Europe during the Italian invasion ofthe 1930s. Ethiopian exiles in the Sudan talked of
setting up a republican form of government, letters were actually written to the French
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1898-1936," in The Southern Marches ofImperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology,
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authorities, seeking assistance and guidance in this matter.93 Exiles in Kenya, Djibouti
and the Sudan were also training and mobilizing resources to assist in the resistance
against Italian occupation.
Although the United States did not emerge as a main destination for most
Ethiopians until the 1960s and 1970s, there is an early twentieth century photograph of
Ethiopians who allegedly immigrated to the United States via Ellis Island and some
historians have used this to substantiate their presence as early as the 1910s.94 A number
of Ethiopians had been sent by Emperor Haile-Selassie to study in the United States in
the 1920s and 1930s. The outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian war in 1935 and the fascist
occupation that followed provoked these Ethiopian students to fight Italy's occupation of
Ethiopia. Young students such as Melaku Beyan played a significant role during the war.
According to Bahiru Zewdie, Melaku set up an organization called United Aid for
Ethiopia and later, the Ethiopian Federation in New York.95 He mobilized Ethiopians
and friends of Ethiopia to raise funds for the war effort, created awareness of the
atrocities committed by the fascist Italian army and rallied support for the resistance
movement in exile. Melaku's ardent sense of patriotism and identification with the
African-American Community helped his effort to raise funds and mobilize African-
American volunteers to fight for Ethiopia.
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Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most Ethiopians came to the United
States either for business, or as tourists, diplomats, and students. Some students came as
the result ofthe strategic military partnership between the United States and Ethiopia
while the rest were given the opportunity of higher education in academic training.
Nevertheless, the majority ofthem went back after accomplishing what they came for.
At the time, most Ethiopians were not planning to reside outside of Ethiopia permanently
due to the relative political stability and the opportunities that were made available to
them. During their stay these students were loosely organized in a social/cultural club.
However, as they were increasingly exposed to the world and interacted with
international students, they gradually started to be politically active. These social and
cultural organizations also changed as international educational exchange flowered in
Ethiopia and political change swept across Africa.96 Through their organization, the
Ethiopian Student Union in North America (ESUNA), the students played an active role
in the political process in Ethiopia. According to Alem Asres,
They conducted demonstration against the regime to focus media attention on
the relationship between the United States government and the Haile-Selassie
regime as well as to expose the dictatorial nature ofthe emperor's rule, also
through the organization's journal, Challenge they disseminated political
information. The students maintained pressure and latched onto every
opportunity to expose the emperor and his tie with the U.S. up to the 1974
revolution. During this time, ESUNA continued to produce theoretical
literature which it injected into Ethiopia. Its members and leadership fixed
themselves on the pulse of change and events in Ethiopia, safely transmitting
information to the international community.97
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The role ofEthiopian students in North America along with Ethiopian students in
Western Europe and Ethiopia is also discussed by authors such as Balsvik in 1985, Kiflu
in 1995, and Solomon in 2000. According to these scholars, the Ethiopian students in
North America and Europe along with their counter parts in Ethiopia have played a
significant role in the political process in Ethiopia. This movement produced activists
such as Germame Niwaye who was one ofthe leaders ofthe failed coup of December
1960. Political groups such as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and
the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM) came out ofthis process. Consequently,
these two political parties played a major role in the 1974 revolution and the ensuing
period. They were also responsible to a certain extent for radicalizing the military junta
that dethroned Emperor Haile-Selassie. Getachew and Maigenet argued the following,
... Exiled Ethiopian students, who had called for fundamental political and
economic changes returned in support of the revolution. These returnees
brought with them their political division and antagonisms. These political
divisions later manifested itself in the birth oftwo major political groups
mainly the EPRP and the AESM. It was this division that assisted in the
catapult of the Derg, which remained in power for seventeen years.
The repudiation of the Eritrean federation was also another source of political
turmoil and displacement. Many that were opposed to the unification of Eritrea to
Ethiopia left for neighboring Sudan and the Middle East, while others later joined guerilla
movements. Exile groups in Cairo later formed the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) in
98. Metaferia Getachew and Shifferraw Maigenet, The Ethiopian Revolution of1974 and the
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1961, which was known to launch armed attacks and also to cast its struggle for Eritrean
00
independence within a pan-Arab mould.
The 1974 Ethiopian revolution is a critical juncture in the political development of
the country as well as in the migration pattern of Ethiopians. Prior to the 1974 revolution
most Ethiopians were keen to return to their homeland. The majority ofthe Ethiopians
that left Ethiopia to the United States and Western Europe were also the children of the
royal family and the aristocracy, as well as sons and daughters of those Ethiopians who
could afford to finance their children's education abroad. Most ofthese Ethiopians were
unfamiliar with the very concept of refugee and repelled by the very idea of moving
abroad permanently.
However, the rule ofthe Derg heralded an era of mass migration that has no
precedent in the history of Ethiopia. Outward migration during the seventeen years of
military rule had several causes. Specifically, Ethiopians left the country to flee from
political persecution, war, forced conscription, famine and the Derg's resettlement and
villagization program.
In the ensuing period, the military regime resorted to brutal measures in order to
quell opposition to its rule. It began summarily executing, torturing and imprisoning
hundreds and thousands of Ethiopians that were accused of attempting to overthrow the
government. As a consequence, those who escaped the wrath of the Derg started fleeing
out ofthe country by the thousands. Those who were already in the United States and
other countries at the time decided not to return while those in the country sought to leave
at any cost. As a consequence, by the early 1980s, "roughly 80 percent ofthe students,
99. Zewde, A History ofModern Ethiopia, 219.
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60 percent ofthe business persons and 20 percent ofthe tourists from Ethiopia who
entered the United States prior to the revolution did not exit upon the expiration oftheir
temporary non-immigrant visa.100 Zewde writes that by 1986, an estimated 22
ambassadors, 40 senior diplomats and 14 cabinet ministers defected to the West, mainly
to the United States.101
Another cause of migration was the threat of civil war and conscription. The
Derg's ruthlessness escalated preexisting conflicts and incited new ones. The EPLF was
soon joined by the OLF, and the TPLF, which were to play a role in the demise of the
Derg. Externally, the Derg was also faced with another conflict with Somalia. As a
result of the internal and external pressures, the Derg's standing army grew to be one of
the largest in Africa, comprised of an estimated 300,000 men and women as well as
under 150,000 militia.102 The army was constantly in need ofnew conscripts because of
the ongoing conflict, and many that wanted to evade the conscription were forced to flee.
As of 1988, roughly 660,000 Ethiopian sought refuge in the Sudan fleeing war and
conscription, while another 365,000 traveled into Somalia.103 Ethiopian refugee
communities in neighboring countries continued to be recruiting ground for the
opposition thereby playing a role in transnational politics.
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The high incidence of famine was another contributor to migration. A major
famine in 1984 in the northern part of Ethiopia was compounded by the Derg's slow
response, thus leading to the death ofmany, while those who were able to flee ended up
in the Sudan. Most of these refugees returned once things normalized, but some went to
North Africa and the Middle East, while others were resettled in Western European
countries and the United States. According to Seye Abraha, a prominent opposition
figure and a former high ranking member ofthe TPLF, the TPLF was also equally
responsible for the politicization of food aid and the migration ofmany to the Sudan.
In the ensuing period, as a solution to the country's drought problem, the government
launched a forced villagization and resettlement program. The program was designed to
move farmers into planned villages built around utility supply points such as water,
schools and medical services. The program disrupted traditional relationship, ancestral
linkages and the social services never materialized.104 The Derg was also accused of
using the program to weaken the opposition by depriving the rebel movements their
cover in the population. Many peasants fled rather than embark on forced relocation.
Another major source of migration was the mass resettlement of Ethiopian Jews
in Israel. According to the Jewish Federation of America, after the rise of Christianity in
Ethiopia in the fourth century, the Jews who refused to convert were persecuted and
withdrew to the mountainous Gondar region where they made their homes for more than
2000 years.105 More recently, these Ethiopian Jews were living on the outskirts of the
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city of Gondar. During the reign of the Derg, small groups of Jews began to flee, joining
refugee villages on the other side of the Sudanese border. Beginning in the 1980s, the
Israeli government recognized these people as Jews and began to implement a series of
operations that resulted in the migration of thousands of Ethiopian Jews to Israel.
Towards the fall ofthe Derg regime and in the ensuing period, thousands of Ethiopian
Jews also continued to migrate to Israel. The majority of these Ethiopian Jews are still
struggling to adjust to Israel and feel greatly discriminated against by fellow Israelis.
Although not fully integrated, these Ethiopian Jews have definitely become part of Israel,
while still having an impact on their home country in so many different ways such as
sending remittances to their family or visiting.
If we look at the history of migration to the United States, during the Cold War
and up until the mid-1990s, the majority of refugees resettled were people from the
former Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. Although the numbers were smaller compared
to former Soviet Union and South East Asia, the United States was also resettling
refugees from Africa. Among these were Ethiopian refugees that sought refuge in
neighboring countries such as Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti that were brought to the
United States. The United States Refugee Resettlement Bureau resettled some 28,000
political refugees alone and these Ethiopians were from all walks of life ranging from
illiterate peasants to high school, university students, and professors.106 Consequently,
those who resettled in the United States as refugees began to be joined by immigrants that
sought asylum after getting into the United States and those that came through spousal
106. Solomon Addis Getahun, "Brain Drain and Its Effect on institutions of Higher Learning,
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reunion program. Therefore, political instability in the 1970s and the large refugee
overflow ofthe 1980s led to the development of the Ethiopian Diaspora.107
During the Cold War period, despite the lack ofpolitical unanimity among the
Ethiopian immigrants, there have been some efforts ofpolitical engagement focused at
the politics ofthe homeland. Rallies and protest marches were held to expose the
atrocities committed by the Derg. Also, the different opposition movements such as the
EPRP, AESM, and the liberation movements such as the EPLF, the ELF, the TPLF, and
the OLF have been actively involved in lobbying, fundraising, demonstrations and rallies
to varying extent with the view of overthrowing the Derg regime.
The collapse of the Derg was said to be opening an era of peace and development.
The political decisions taken by the TGE seem to support this initial assumption. The
first step taken by the EPRDF was to call an almost all inclusive national conference.
The conference represented an encouraging early sign that the leaders of the EPRDF
intended to reach and include a variety of political groups. Several refugees were being
repatriated from neighboring countries in the immediate period. However the transition
that begun with a broadly inclusive initiative, ended within a short period of time with a
single party dominant political system. Political repression became wide spread.
In addition to the political turmoil, economic factors featured prominently in the
process ofmigration. Ethiopians began to be pushed out ofthe country because of the
challenges of globalizations; faced with unemployment and meager wages, most started
to leave the country to places with better opportunity. These developments were further
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facilitated by the United States Immigration Act of 1990. The Diversity Visa Lottery
program put in place to increase the number of immigrants from countries that are
underrepresented in U.S. immigration opened up more opportunity for many Ethiopians
to migrate to the United States. This program is also a major facilitator of the brain-drain
from African countries. Most of the people who come through the program are highly
educated Africans who used to be in managerial, technical and professional positions in
their respective countries.
The increase in the number of migrants produced an increase in the number of
ethnic organizations and associations. Like other immigrant groups, Ethiopians found
ways to keep in touch with one another and continue to practice their home customs.
They established community newspapers, magazines and radio programs. Ethiopians
who saw the need to establish various organizations to deal with specific challenges also
begun to form organizations that will perform a wide variety of economic, cultural,
religious, social, and political functions.
In major cities such as Atlanta, Chicago, DC, Los Angeles, and Toronto, self-help
organizations to assist with adjustment needs of newcomers were established. For
example, Ethiopian Community Associations in major cities provided services such as
case management, job placement, language training and citizenship classes. The
community associations also organized celebrations of Ethiopian Day with live
performances of Ethiopian music and dances too.
However, once the EPRDF assumed government power, rather than constructing
a pan-Ethiopian identity, it begun to institute ethnic federalism. Consequently, political
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divisions permeated into the social and economic life in Ethiopia as well as among the
members of the Diaspora. As a result, social and economic institutions have also been to
a certain extent politicized and fragmented. Some Ethiopian ethnic and religious groups
created centers of their own. For example, there are Oromo and Adere associations,
which mobilize and cater for their own ethnic groups.
The EPRDF government for instance deposed the then Patriarch and replaced him
with a new Tigrean patriarch. The government's explanation was that the Patriarch
Merqorios had been affiliated with the Communist regime and hence the regime change
also necessitated a change in the church leadership. Others, however, alleged that
Patriarch Merqorios was removed from his post because ofhis ethnic background. The
actions ofthe government initiated a crisis in the Ethiopian Orthodox church. It divided
the Holy Synod ofthe Ethiopian Orthodox Church between supporters and opponents of
the late Patriarch Paulos. The crisis in the Ethiopian Orthodox church was not confined
to Ethiopia. It spilled over to the Diaspora as well, resulting in a split in the congregation
among Ethiopians in the United States and other parts of the world where Ethiopian
communities exist. Churches that were places of worship, regardless of ethnicity and
regional differences, began to split resulting in two Synods—the Ethiopian Orthodox
church Synod in Ethiopia and the Synod in exile. Furthermore, a power rivalry within
the Synod in exile created more division. According to Getahun,
The initial division of the clergy and laity between those who supported the
EPRDF appointee patriarch and those who stood against him, was slowly
taking a different turn. Among the five members ofthe Ethiopian Orthodox
church Synod in exile, four ofthem were Gondares (men from Gondar). What
is more, the deposed Patriarch too was from Gondar. Accordingly, some
individuals among the Ethiopians in America (mainly those from Shoa) have
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condemned the Synod in exile as a Gondare maneuver to dominate the
Ethiopian Orthodox church in the Diaspora.108
Furthermore, divisions have also permeated into the social and economic life of
the members of the Diaspora. As a result, social and economic institutions have also
been highly politicized and fragmented. Some Ethiopian ethnic and religious groups
created centers oftheir own, such as the Oromo associations and Adere associations,
while other formed regional organizations, which mobilize and cater to their own groups.
For example, the Gondar Mutual Association membership criterion is being a Gondare
borninGondar.109
Consequently the divisions were also manifested in different forms. While the
EPRDF government imprisoned its opponents, Ethiopians in the Diaspora protested, but
only ifthey believed that the person imprisoned was considered their own. At the time
when Dr. Taye Woldesemaiat, Chairman of the Ethiopian Teachers association, and
Birtukan Mideksa, an opposition leader, were imprisoned without due process of law,
candlelight vigils, rallies, and even letters were written to lawmakers and one can say
there was quite a movement. However, on the other hand, when the Derg officials were
languishing in prison indefinitely almost nothing was done to voice an opposition. Also,
when Siye Abraha and other former TPLF officials were imprisoned, there was not much
done in terms of either condemning the act or rallying in support of the victims. Support
for the release of imprisoned former official Seye Abraha was mainly coming from
Tigrean members of the Diaspora that came from the same region that he was said to be
108. Getahun, The History ofEthiopian Immigrants, 49.
109. Ibid., 111-113.
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born. One wonders if such inconsistency may have to do with ethnic politics. The
Ethiopian Diaspora is comprised of disparate groups. These groups are not necessarily
ethnically based, but there are ethnic divisions among the Diaspora.11 ° Moreover, with
so many opposition groups, viewpoints and interests, the politically active Diaspora
remains divided. Divisions are also exacerbated by extremist and separatist agendas
promoted by groups such as the OLF. Therefore, because of the highly divisive nature of
much ofthe discourse in the Diaspora, it is extremely difficult to engage in dialogue and
stand together to fight for and address broader issues of democratization and economic
development.
In May 1998, Eritrean military forces invaded the border areas of Ethiopia. At the
time, the camp of government supporters constituted a relatively homogenous group
within the Diaspora, but the opposition was very much fragmented and characterized by
frequent changes of alliances, splits and re-constitutions as well as deeply rooted tensions
and distrust. However, the conflict with Eritrea briefly provided an opportunity for
forces in the Diaspora to unite against the invasion. Ethiopians in the Diaspora that were
opposed to the EPRDF government were mobilized and engaged in the conflict along
side the supporters ofthe government. This brief period of unity may have been possible
in the name of nationalism. As Benedict Anderson argues, a nation is an imagined
community,
Regardless ofthe actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each,
the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship. Ultimately,
it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so
110. Fransen and Kuschminder, Migration in Ethiopia, 41.
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many people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited
imaginings.111
Terrence Lyons also argued that Ethiopians in the Diaspora tend to have a territorially
defined concept of an Ethiopian homeland that is key to their identity. For many, this
"Ethiopia" continues to include Eritrea (independent since 1991).112 Therefore, the
conflict was viewed by those opposed to the government as an opportunity to assert
Ethiopia's territorial integrity by reclaiming the port of Assab. Later on, the unity came
to an end in opposition to the regime's acceptance of the Algiers agreement because it did
not preserve all Ethiopian territory. Furthermore, supporters of the government were
divided based on the split and purge that took place within the government due to the
handling ofthe war and the peace agreement.
In retrospect, the two main opposition coalitions that participated in the May 2005
elections had clear roots in the Diaspora ofNorth America and Europe. Both coalitions
had a strong financial backing of the opposition in the United States. In the aftermath of
the controversial election of 2005, leaders of the CUD traveled to Europe and North
America organizing a series of meetings. After deliberating with its supporters in the
U.S.A., the CUD made the decision to boycott rather than to engage, it was clear that
important voices from the Diaspora clearly had a role in shaping the decision. Other
elected UEDP members ofparliament, such as Lidetu, took up their seats but faced fierce
111. Anderson Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin andSpread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 224.
112. Terrence Lyons, "Globalization, Diasporas and Conflict" (paper presented at the Conference
on Globalization, Terrirotialiry and Conflict, San Diego, CA, January 16-18,2004).
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criticism and physical threats from the Diaspora. Key elements in the Diaspora aligned
themselves with the CUD leaders and behind a strategy of disengagement.
The Ethiopian Diaspora has clearly become active in Ethiopian politics.
Especially during the time leading to the May 2005 election, the Diaspora was largely
active in Ethiopian politics through fundraising, lobbying and engaging in political
debates as well as advocacy. Opposition groups in the Diaspora were successful in
having scheduled hearings in the United States Congress and even managed to present a
bill to help assure Human Rights in Ethiopia in the aftermath ofthe 2005 election. This
was the Ethiopian Human Rights Bill (H.R.5680) also known as the Ethiopian Freedom,
Democracy and Accountability Act of 2006, which despite the support from members of
the United States Congress, failed to appear on the House floor because ofthe lobby
against the bill financed by the government in Ethiopia.113 Eventually, the
disillusionment and frustration of the aftermath and the division and bickering led many
to withdraw from the political scene, while few remained to be actively engaged in
different forms. In an article posted on the Ethiopian review website, Dr. Maru Gobena
made the following observation about the post 2005 election political atmosphere,
In summary, though difficult to measure in objective terms, I would,
nonetheless, dare to say that the price to be paid for the direct and indirect
repercussions ofthese tragic events and related infighting would be, as has
already been witnessed, the gradual disappearance of political movements and
politically active community members, the breakup of already weakened
social relationships and work within the Ethiopian Diaspora community, and
unquestionably—and more essentially—the extension of the lifespan of Meles
113. Getachew Metaferia. Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy andAnalysis
(New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), 118.
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Zenawi by an additional two or more decades, unless some kind of coup d'etat
within his own circle, possibly by the armed forces, were to occur.114
Professor Getachew Metaferia also made the following observation: "One reason for the
absence of a focused political agenda among the Diaspora Ethiopians is political
difference and personal rivalry.115 There is also a lack of ideological coherence. As a
result, both political and non-political organizations have failed to work for a higher
national goal and vision."116
In summary, the migration of Ethiopians in general has been mostly a result of
political and economic factors, ranging from persecution and famine to the process of
globalization and changing immigration laws in the receiving countries. Understanding
of the details of the migration process of Ethiopians is important to investigate and speak
about the political views of Ethiopians in the Diaspora.
114. Maru Gobena, "Revisiting the Aftermath of2005 Ethiopia Election," http://ethiopian
review.com (accessed October 12,2010); Maru Gobena, "Reviewing the Damaging Effects of Ethiopian
Diaspora Politics," http://mahder.com (accessed October 12,2010).
115. Metaferia. Ethiopia and the United States,,109.
116. Getachew andMaigenet, The Ethiopian Revolution of1974, 125.
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Notes
i. Although the Amhara share the same language it must be noted that there are divisions and
schisms through out history between the Amhara of Gonder and the Amhara of Shoa. For instance,
intermittent armed conflict raged between the Shoan Empire, Gondar and Gojam during the Era ofthe
Princesses (1786-1853).
ii. The Constitution was revised in 1955 to accommodate or meet the demand of Eritrea, which
was federated with Ethiopia in 1952.
iii. It is interesting to see the same mistakes being repeated in the coup attempt staged against
Mengistu Hailemariam.
iv. The Americans played a key role in saving their client regime from failing. Technical help was
given to the loyalists. Also the American military advisor threatened to bring two squadrons ofAir Force
jets from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and bomb the rebels.
v. The Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) was a group formed by the members ofthe feudal
regime
vi. According to Bahiru, the historical origins ofthe movement could be traced back to the sense
ofmarginalization that the region and its elite have felt since the death ofEmperor Yohannes and the ascent
ofMenelik to imperial power in 1889.
CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The various categorization and definitions of Diaspora are delineated by various
scholars in Diaspora studies. The term Diaspora comes from the Greek word diaspeirein
meaning "the dispersal or scattering of seeds."l The concept was originally used to refer
to the dispersal and settlement of Jews outside Palestine following the Babylonian exile
586 B.C.2 Subsequently the term became associated with different groups and their
dispersal with different connotations of the term.
A large body of scholarship has investigated the concept of Diaspora.
Researchers have created categories to identify and outline a historical typology thus
dividing Diaspora groups as ancient, modern and incipient.3 Others divide the categories
strictly based on the reason for the dispersal; thus classifying groups based on their
reason for dispersal as victims, imperial, labor, trade, and cultural Diaspora. Each
category of the typology is discussed at length and well-documented examples are given.
1. Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 8; Yossi Shain, The Frontiers ofLoyalty: Political Exiles in the Age ofthe Nation-State
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 8.
2. Ibid.
3. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 8; Rey Koslowski, ed., International Migration and the
Globalization ofDomestic Politics (London: Routledge, 2005), 1-5.





The Jewish Diaspora, probably the most cited example in the literature, as well as
the Armenian and African Diasporas are seen as examples ofthe victim category.
The Indian and British Diasporas are examples of labor and imperial dispersals.
The Chinese and Lebanese, as well as many ofthe overseas Indian communities,
are examples of trade Diasporas.5
According to Sheffer, although the term Diaspora is used by many to designate
the Jewish community living outside of Palestine or the modern state of Israel, in reality
the term refers to the dispersal of any previously homogenous population.6 Thus, it is a
continuing and universal phenomenon that transcends Jewish history. Those migrants
who maintain their identities and connections with their homelands while residing
permanently in a host country constitute themselves into "ethno-national Diasporas."
Depending on the situation and the status of the migrants, these dispersals may also take
different forms such as modern Diaspora, incipient Diaspora, stateless Diasporas, state-
based Diasporas, and dormant Diasporas.8 Although unique in important ways, these
various Diasporas also share common characteristics.
Hence, most authors agree that there are common elements in all forms of
Diaspora. These are people who live outside their homeland and recognize that their
traditional homelands are reflected deeply in the languages they speak, religions and
cultures they practice, the linkage they create with their homeland, and acknowledge that
5. Ibid.




the old country has claim on their loyalty and emotions.9 Historians and social
scientists have also described many aspects of the term Diaspora while an increasing
number of communities and groups call themselves Diasporas, thus leading to a common
usage ofthe term. Overall, during the past few years the term Diaspora has become a
loose reference confusing categories such as immigrants, guest workers, ethnic and racial
minorities, refugees, expatriates and travelers.10 Several Diaspora studies scholars share
the same view. They agree that while Diaspora once was a designation that exclusively
expressed the experience of dispersal in Jewish, Greek, and Armenian histories, the term
now "shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant,
expatriate, refugee, guest workers, exile community, overseas community, and ethnic
community."11 Cohen similarly comments,
Diaspora is the term used today to describe particularly any population which
is considered deterritorialized or transnational, that is, which originated in the
land other than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic, and
political networks crosses the borders of nation states, or indeed span the
globe.12
Researchers also agree that the term Diaspora has become a term of self-
identification among many varied groups. This fact is observable in a multitude of
websites (a Google search gives close to four 45 million hits for Diaspora) and other
9. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 15; Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 14; Jacob
Bercovitch, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 2007), 18.
10. Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism (New York: Routledge, 2009), 128.
11. Khachig Tololyan, Stateless Power and the Political Agency ofDiasporas: An Armenian
Case Study (Reno, NV: University ofNevada Center for Basque Studies, 2007), 216.
12. Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 26.
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media outlets.13 Today, technology makes it far easier for these groups to function
and remain connected in a transnational community. In particular, cheap air travels,
cheap phone calls, the internet and satellite televisions have made staying in touch
affordable in the social, economic and political life ofthe homeland. Jet airliners,
international telephone services, satellite television, fax machines and the Internet have
made it easier for emigrants to maintain contact with their homelands and participate in
homeland politics.14
Diasporas could play an increasingly significant part in the development of nation
building in developing countries. This is due to a number of factors, including access to
economic resources, greater ease in communication and travel, and the large number of
expatriate professionals and entrepreneurs who have skills and experience to offer. The
foremost means ofDiaspora nation building comes through individual remittance,
hometown associations and charitable initiatives that directly affect economic
development.15
13. Vertovec, Transnationalism, 128; Rogers Brubaker, "The "Diaspora" Diaspora," Ethnic and
Racial Studies 2Z, no. 1 (2005): 1-19.
14. Koslowski, International Migration and the Globalization ofDomestic Politics, 23; Michel S.
Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2006), 37; Yossi Shain,
"Ethnic Diasporas and U. S. Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 109, no.5 (1994-95): 811-841.
15. Kim D. Butler, "Multi-Level Politics in the African Diaspora: The Meta-Diaspora Concept
and Mini-Diaspora Realities," in Gloria P. TotoricagUena, ed., Opportunity Structures in Diaspora
Relations: Comparisons in Contemporary Multi-level Politics ofDiaspora and Transnational Identity,
(Reno, NV: Center for Basque Studies, University ofNevada-Reno, 2007), 19-51; Koslowski, International
Migration and the Globalization ofDomestic Politics, 17; Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 28; Tololyan,
Stateless Power and the Political Agency ofDiasporas, 215; Gloria Totoricaguena, "The Political Agency
ofEthnic Diasporas: Paradiplomacy and the Construction of Political Communities in the World System,"
in Gloria P. Totoricaguena, ed., Opportunity Structures in Diaspora Relations: Comparisons in
Contemporary Multi-level Politics ofDiaspora and Transnational Identity, (Reno, NV: Center for Basque
Studies, University ofNevada-Reno, 2007), 235-262.
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Political interests and activities within Diasporas are certainly nothing new.
Historical studies of migrant communities indicate that a considerable degree of political
engagement is evident. Emigrants in Diaspora have influenced the domestic politics and
the foreign policies of their home countries throughout history. Migrants have also
become politically active in the host country to which they migrated, in order to influence
the foreign policies oftheir host countries toward their homeland. History provides many
examples of nation-creation projects fashioned in exile; Garibaldi, Lenin, Gandhi and Ho
Chi Minh all spent time abroad actively engaging in the politics of their respective home
countries.16 History is also full of examples of leaders and activists abroad to support
separatist or irredentist movements in their homelands from foreign control.17 With
regard to what motivates Diasporas to participate in their homelands politics, different
authors have pointed out various reasons for their motivation. It is argued that sending
countries political development such as international or interstate conflict, regime change
and nation building effort or environmental disaster may mobilize both recently departed
migrants as well as established Diasporas.18 Sending countries are used to maintaining
ties with their Diaspora populations by extending to them the right to vote in national
16. Vertovec, Transnationalism, 3.
17. Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 125; Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 14; Alejandro
Portes, Luis Guaraizo, and Patricia Landolt, "The Study of Transnationalism, Pitfalls and Promise of an
Emergent Research Field," Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 2 (March 1999): 217-237; Eva Ostergaard-
Nielsen, "The Democratic Deficit of Diaspora Politics: Turkish Cypriots in Britain and The Cyprus Issue,"
Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies 29, no. 4 (2003): 683-700.
18. Koslowski, International Migration and the Globalization ofDomestic Politics, 27;
Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization, 21; Ostergaard-Nielsen, "The Democratic Deficit of
Diaspora Politics," 692; Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 23.
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elections, run for political office, or even hold dual citizenship.19 Moreover, recent
scholarship also shows that beside governments of sending countries, political elites of
sending country and actors such as political parties look for economic and political
support among emigrants.20 The greater openness and tolerance of host societies and
governments toward ethnic diversity, a multicultural incorporating regime can also
contribute to transnational political orientation because of the resources and space given
to institutionalization of ethnic organization.21 The increasing freedom of Diaspora
groups to determine, maintain and display their identities and cultures and to join local,
social and political groups and parties, as well as Diaspora associations, without
excessive host government pressures also increases their opportunities to develop and
maintain regular ties with their homelands.22
The United States is a good example of such a political system, which provides
many rights for its citizens as well as non-citizens. Such a conducive environment
provides opportunities that otherwise may not be possible. Moreover, if U.S. interest
coincides with the political activity of Diaspora groups, it will result in official support
and motivation. Even relatively new Diasporas such as the Iraqis have become
19. Peggy Levitt, The Transnational Villagers (Berkley, CA: University of California Press,
2001), 127; Linda G. Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound:
Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and DeterritorializedNation-States (Langbome, PA:
Gordon and Breach, 1994), 225.
20. Jose Itzigsohn, "Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship," International Migration
Review 34, no.4, (2000): 1126-1154; Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization, 133; Ostergaard-
Nielsen, "The Democratic Deficit of Diaspora Politics," 684.
21. Ostergaard-Nielsen, "The Democratic Deficit ofDiaspora Politics," 687; Shain, "Ethnic
Diasporas andU.S Foreign Policy 1994-95," 814.
22. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 160.
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influential not only in their domestic politics but also in international politics and
foreign policy of other countries as it relates to their country. A member of the Iraqi
Diaspora group such as Ahmed Challabi, a leader ofthe Iraqi National Congress was an
influential figure in the U.S. foreign policy circles during the George W. Bush
administration. As this example illustrates, Diaspora groups can play a wide variety of
roles in the domestic politics and foreign policy making of host countries. This example
also shows how U.S. interest coincided with the political activities of some of the Iraqi
Diaspora group members and resulted in official U.S. support.
With regard to the methods of engagement, Sheffer points out that Diasporas
create trans-state communication networks because of their need to maintain contact with
their homelands and other dispersed communities of the same origin.23 The use of such
networks to affect contact with their homelands is not a new phenomenon. However,
what makes the current reality different is the simultaneous development of what he calls
distance-shrinking technologies alongside globalization, and increasing Diasporism.
Diasporas, therefore, can use these communication technologies to advance their interest.
They can use them for communication with the homeland and to express concerns and
voice opinions. Through their transnational activity, they can play positive as well as
negative role in terms of their relation with the homeland, host country or other groups.
However, Sheffer contends that no Diaspora group could influence the political process




cooperation with other interested parties, and by lobbying in their host countries, they
could have an impact on the political process.25 The tactics and tools Diaspora groups
employ are varied. For example, they lobby for reforms and even support revolts and
revolutions. Moreover, Diasporas have served as valuable sources of information and
intelligence about homelands in cases in which host governments have planned hostile
actions against those homelands; they initiate propaganda campaigns, and more
subversive activities against homelands. All those measures have been used by the Iraqi,
Iranian, and Cuban Diasporas for example.26 The Ethiopian Diaspora did react in the
same manner too during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.
The diverse strategy and tactics used by Diaspora groups is also noted by other
scholars in the study of Diaspora politics. Diaspora groups may draw upon their own
resources in order to influence the host country government to pursue particular policy
towards the homeland. Diasporas employ, on the one hand, confrontational strategies
such as demonstrations, mass meetings, hunger strikes, even violent terrorist activities.
On the other hand, Diasporas organize panel discussions and information campaigns,
etc.27 hi addition to lobbying the governments ofthe host country, Diaspora groups
attempt to influence the media and public debate ofthe countries they inhabit, and appeal
25. Ibid., 180.
26. Ibid., 225; Koslowski, International Migration and the Globalization ofDomestic Politics,
29; Susan Eva Eckstein, The Immigration Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the U. S. and Their
Homeland (New York: Routledge, 2009), 88.
27. Eva K. Ostergaard-Nielsen, "Transnational Political Practices and the Receiving State: Turks
and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands," Global Networks 1, no. 3 (July 2001): 261.
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to supranational organizations such as the United Nations.28 On a number of
occasions the Ethiopian Diaspora opposition groups in the United States have used the
same strategy by appealing to supranational organizations such as the World Bank and
United Nations.
Diaspora groups that are in a conflictual relationship could also collaborate with
each other. It was interesting to see how opposition groups that were against the current
regime in Ethiopia put aside their differences and created a united front with the
Ethiopian government and its supporters in the Diaspora to raise funds and rally against
Eritrea during the 2000, Ethio-Eritrean border conflict. Diaspora political engagement
has both informal and formal aspects ranging from individuals seeking political office in
the host country to operating through lobbyists and nonprofit organizations.29 As it is
clear from the above examples, there is a degree of scholarly consensus that Diasporas
may draw on a variety of strategies to promote their political agenda.
However, there seems to be a lack of consensus among scholars when it comes to
measuring the impact of Diaspora groups' political participation in the homeland. While
the effects of direct financial transfers to homeland political parties can be readily
measured, assessing the effects ofmass demonstrations, publicity campaigns, or lobbying
efforts in the host country is more complicated.30
28. Tololyan, Stateless Power and the Political Agency ofDiasporas, 220-221.
29. Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization, 73.
30. Ostergaard-Nielsen, "The Democratic Deficit of Diaspora Politics," 689.
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Older and newer Diasporas1 share basic characteristics, such as their
motivations for migrating out of their homelands, their determination to maintain their
identities that tie them to their homelands, their development of communal solidarity, and
their need to organize and establish local and international networks. Diaspora scholars
have always been aware ofthe important role Diasporas can play in the politics of their
homelands as the works of Sheffer and Sham, in particular have demonstrated.31
Diasporas clearly play a role in world politics. On one hand, their direct economic,
political or military interventions are crucial part of political developments in their
homeland. On the other hand, they influence the foreign policy consideration oftheir
host countries. An analysis ofU.S. policies towards the Middle East, Haiti, Cuba or
Northern Ireland would be deficient without considering the efforts of the Jewish, Arab,
Haitian, Cuban or Irish Diasporas, respectively.32
Although Diasporas alone could not fundamentally change basic patterns of
development in their homelands they have the potential to generate unpleasant situations
in their relations with their homelands and host countries, but they could also contribute
positively. For Sheffer, Diasporas are not as dangerous as they are sometimes perceived
and portrayed; they can serve as important facilitators of internal, interstate, and
worldwide political, cultural and economic connections.33 Sheffer also argues that
31. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 181; Shain, The Frontier ofLoyality, 13.
32. Ostergaard-Nielsen, "Transnational Political Practices," 771; Shain, The Frontier ofLoyality,
163; Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization, 79.
33. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 182.
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"there is a difference between stateless Diasporas and state-linked Diasporas in terms
ofthe strategy they adopt. Stateless Diasporas are significantly more likely to fuel
conflict. They often mobilize to collect money and weapons, help armed struggle at
home and mount campaigns for the recognition of irredentist states."34
The same development is noted in the role of the Eritrean Diaspora in the struggle
for independence.35 In cases where a cohesive homeland does not exist, support for
violence to achieve that goal may be common. Koser argues that a Diaspora or a section
of it can go through a cyclical relationship with the homeland that sustains both violent
and nonviolent phases.36 Sheffer also suggests that state-linked Diasporas are more
likely to be engaged in benign activities, including communal organization in the host
countries, fundraising, sending remittances, investing in the home country, and engaging
in social and economic development ofhome villages and regions.37
A study by World Bank scholars identify Diasporas as critical to the funding and
support of insurgent groups engaged in civil wars. The study focuses on the links
between remittance and civil war thus concluding that, after five years ofpost-conflict
34. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 205.
35. Khalid Koser, "African Diasporas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: An Eritrean Case Study,"
in Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers, eds. Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 2007), 243-252.
36. Ibid.
37. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 189.
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peace, the risk of renewed conflict is around six times higher in the societies with the
largest Diaspora in America than those without American resident Diaspora.38 This,
according to the authors, is the result of financial contributions of Diaspora to rebel
groups. Also, Sheffer, Koser, and Hoeffler made the distinction that Diaspora group
contribution and assistance to rebel groups or stateless Diasporas increase the chance of
conflict.39 More importantly, Collier and Hoeffler made further distinction by
concluding that the size of the Diaspora increases the chance for conflict.40 Those few
secessionist movements that are able to scale-up to being organizations with a serious
political or military capability are likely to occur in rich regions and they may also reflect
the fantasies of Diasporas settled in rich countries.41 Therefore, the authors are alluding
to the fact that resource rich Diaspora groups could end up aggravating a conflict by
channeling resources to irredentist groups.
However, there is no consensus among scholars with regard to determining the
impact ofthe political participation of Diaspora groups. Scholars such as Terrence Lyons
argue that the cause ofmigration of a given Diaspora group will have an impact on the
nature of its political participation and how it deals with the politics of the homeland.
Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic memories "conflict
generated Diaspora groups" tend to compromise less and, therefore, reinforce and
38. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," OxfordEconomic
Papers 56, no.4 (August 2004): 563-595.
39. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 205; Koser, "African Diasporas and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction," 243; Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," 578.
40. Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War," 579-580.
41. Ibid.
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exacerbate the protracted nature of conflicts.42 Lyons further cites Benedict
Anderson's assumption that characterize Diaspora groups as "long distance nationalists"
who are inherently unaccountable because they do not have to pay for the price for the
polarizing policies they support to further reinforce his point of view. In studying the
Ethiopian Diaspora, Lyons argued,
The Ethiopian Diaspora, a conflict generated Diaspora, played a critical role in the
political events in 2005 and the ongoing crisis through 2007. The Diaspora
leaders shifted their tactics from advocating electoral boycotts to supporting
opposition participation hi election and once again to influencing opposition
leaders to boycotting the parliament following the contentious process of vote
counting, allegation of fraud and arrest of opposition leaders.43
However, Lyons does not deny the fact that it is possible to transform the conflict
generating potential of such groups into a force of peace. On the other hand, Ostergaard-
Nelson contends that, some migrants who fled their homelands due to political
oppression have no desire to engage in transnational political activities; they deliberately
avoid such activities, while migrants who fled their country of origin to pursue better
economic opportunities sometimes find themselves "politicized from afar."
Finally, the division within any Diaspora groups must be considered as a factor in
the discussion. In conceiving Diasporas we should resist assumptions that use a unifying
label. In sharp contrast to members ofthe Diaspora that identify and associate with
Ethiopia, some Oromos in the Diaspora regard the Ethiopian state as a colonial empire in
which the Amharas and the Tigreans colonized and dominated the South. Therefore, key
42. Terrence Lyons, "A Conflict Generated Diaspora and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia,"
Conflict, Security & Development 7, no. 4 (2007): 529-549.
43. Ibid.
44. Ostergaard-Nielsen, "Transnational Political Practices," 783.
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elements within the Oromo Diaspora define themselves through the rejection of the
nation-state of Ethiopia and support the struggle for independence from Ethiopia. The
Oromo Diaspora has a clearly territorially defined sense of identity; maps, nationalist
colors, and images ofthe Oromo national symbol the Sycamore tree cover the walls of
Oromo restaurants, are displayed on bumper stickers and fill Oromo websites and
publications.45 Consequently, groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) argue
that the Oromo people have the right to self-determination and an independent Oromia
state. Internal debate continues within such groups over the main orientation that those
Diasporas should adopt regarding the future oftheir homelands. The integrationists in
such groups would settle for cultural and economic autonomy of their homeland; more
elements that are radical would argue that a separatist strategy should be followed by the
segment of their nation residing in the homeland, with the Diaspora providing substantive
support for such an effort.46
Theoretical Framework
In formulation of a theoretical perspective for studying the Ethiopian Diaspora
and their impact on the political process in Ethiopia, transnationalism provides a useful
framework. Transnationalism is defined as multiple ties and interactions linking people
or institutions across borders of nation-states.47 The concept is used widely in the study
oftransnational activities of migrant communities and the economic, social and cultural
45. Mekuria Bulcha, The Making ofthe Oromo Diaspora (Edina, MN: Kirk House Publishers,
2002), 184.
46. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 206.
47. Koslowski, International Migration and the Globalization ofDomestic Politics, 31.
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impacts. The political impacts oftransnational activities with regard to homeland
politics have been studied using trasnationalism as a framework.48 The increasingly
invoked notion of "transnationalism," referring to various kinds of global or cross-border
connections, currently frames the views ofnumerous researchers concerned with
migrants and dispersed ethnic groups. The emergence of a transnational perspective has
changed the study of immigration. Before the introduction ofthis analytical approach,
the study of immigration assumed that migrants basically broke their ties with their
countries of origin and the process of acculturation and assimilation of migrants to then-
new society was what mattered most. Transnationalism as a perspective challenged these
assumptions.
Unlike trasnationalism, exile politics and Emigre politics tend to focus only on
those who left their homeland because of political reasons when it comes to the study of
political activities directed at the homeland. This is true to a certain extent, because
political exiles may continue to be politically active while they are in exile. Other
migrants may have left their country looking for economic opportunities and a better life
and may not have an active role in politics, but the reason for their economic deprivation
and lack of opportunity may be the political condition of their country. Hence, it is
important to use a theoretical framework that could possibly encompass all kinds of
migrants.
48. Itzigsohn, "Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship," 281-285; Koslowski,




' The term "newer Diasporas" is used in order to distinguish between those Diasporas formed by
the Atlantic slave trade and newer Diasporas in postcolonial era.
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
Chapter IV presents the methods and procedures used in conducting this study. In
this chapter, the following are described: research design, description ofthe site, sample
and population, treatment of data, and limitation of the study.
Research Design
A descriptive and exploratory research design is employed in this study. This
study is designed to collect data in order to describe and explain the motivation and
methods ofpolitical participation of the Ethiopian Diaspora in the United States. An
additional aspect ofthe study is that data are collected from respondents in order to
identify who is participating and how demographic factors affect political participation.
The descriptive and exploratory research design allows for the descriptive analysis ofthe
demographic characteristics ofthe respondents and motivation for political participation.
Description of the Site
The study was mainly conducted in the Atlanta metropolitan area. The study was
also made available on line to the Ethiopian Diaspora in North America. A link to the
survey was also posted on Facebook. Different community institutions, business
establishments, and associations were approached to use their venues to collect the data.
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Restaurants, food stores, and places of worship were also approached with the same
request. However, most have reluctantly agreed to cooperate and display the survey due
to the sensitivity ofthe subject at hand.
For the last twenty-eight years, the Ethiopian Sport Federation in North America
(ESFNA) brings together Ethiopians all over the United States on an annual soccer
tournament. Every year different cities in the United States are selected to host the
tournament. In 2011, Atlanta was the host and the event was held at the Georgia World
Congress Center for one week, from July 3 to July 9,2011. The tournament is viewed by
most Ethiopians as being a venue to socialize and network. With the permission of the
leadership ofESFNA, the survey was distributed during the event. Due to the high
number of Ethiopian cab drivers, the taxi stand at Hartsfield Atlanta airport, known as the
Bullpen, was also used in the hope ofmaximizing the distribution.
Sample and Population
The target population for the research is the Ethiopian community in the United
States. The community consists of immigrants that made the United States their second
home away from home. Some ofthem still retain their citizenship while others are
naturalized and some are born here of Ethiopian parents. The actual number of
Ethiopians in the United States is much more difficult to ascertain. The official figures
do not always differentiate among Ethiopians, Eritreans, and other immigrants or
refugees from the Horn of Africa; they surely understate the size ofthese communities
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both in individual locales and as a whole.1 Thus, given the lack ofthe exact number
ofthe size ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora, the respondents were selected utilizing non-
probability convenience sampling. A significant criticism about using this method is the
limitation in generalization and inference about the entire population. Since the sample is
not representative of the population, the results of this study cannot speak to the entire
population.
Instrumentation
Relevant information was elicited and data was gathered using a survey
questionnaire. The study employs a bilingual survey questionnaire entitled "A Study of
the Motivation and Methods of Participation ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora in the Political
Process in Ethiopia." The survey questionnaire consisted ofthree sections with a total of
forty-eight questions. The questions are prepared in English and Amharic, the latter
being the national language of Ethiopia utilized to make sure that respondents that are not
comfortable with the English language could also respond to the survey. Section I
solicits demographic information regarding the respondents. Section II solicits
information measuring the respondents' motivation for political participation and
methods ofpolitical participation. Section III consists of four open ended questions on
factors of motivation and methods of participation.
Section I of the survey questionnaire contains twenty-two questions (1-22). The
questions in this section are concerned with age group, gender, ethnicity, religion,
education level, primary identity, reason for migration, migration destination, and
1. Kay Kaufinan Shelemay, "Music in the Ethiopian American Diaspora: A Preliminary
Overview" (proceedings ofthe 16th International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Trondheim, Norway,
July 2-6, 2007), 153-64.
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membership in ethnic and religious groups. These questions provide information for
the presentation of a demographic profile ofthe respondents' vis-a-vis motivation for and
methods of political participation.
Section II consists oftwenty-two questions (23-44). Section II consists of
selected statements about motivation and methods ofpolitical participation. The section
is designed to capture data about factors motivating participants to participate in politics
and the degree ofparticipation as well as methods used in political engagements. Items
in Section II ofthe survey are designed on a four point continuum Likert Scale. The
scale is as follows: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, and 4 = Strongly
Agree.
Section III consists of four open-ended questions (45-48). These questions are
designed to give respondents the opportunity to explain further themselves in detail with
regard to factors of motivation and methods of participation.
Treatment of the Data
The study employs descriptive statistics, which include measures of central
tendency, frequency distribution, and cross tabulation. Frequency distributions were used
to analyze each ofthe variables ofthe study in order to summarize the basic findings. A
frequency distribution independent of the motivational and participatory variables under
study was used to develop a demographic profile to gain insights about the respondents of
the study. Cross tabulation was utilized to demonstrate the statistical relationship
between the demographic variables and motivation and methods of engagement.
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Open-ended questions were included in section III ofthe questionnaire to give
respondents the opportunity to elaborate their responses in section II and offer further
insight. The responses from section III were read to identify the common emerging
themes. Emerging themes were then organized into categories. The coding categories
were then used as a means of sorting the descriptive data and the patterns in the
responses. Once the responses were analyzed and the major patterns and trends were
identified and sorted, a summary ofthe findings was developed. Descriptive text
incorporating some ofthe narratives directly from the respondents is also included in the
discussion ofthe findings.
Limitations of the Study
This study is limited by a variety of factors, such as time, finances, and feasibility.
Future research could supplement this study by surveying a larger representative sample
and interviewing and using focus groups. Such an effort would provide more
comprehensive data. An in-depth analysis on the operation of various Diaspora
associations would also yield rich data. Assessing the viewpoint of the government as
well as Ethiopians in Ethiopia could give a more complete understanding of the role of
the Diaspora. However, due to the author's position in the Ethiopian community,
perceived by some as the supporter ofthe EPRDF, an in-depth interview was not
possible. Therefore, the study is limited to an anonymous survey.
Although probability sampling methods are preferable to nonprobability samples,
in the absence of a population census that identifies the exact number of Ethiopians and
also a breakdown of the population living in these major cities by age, gender, and
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education, it is impossible to calculate how accurate an estimate the sample is going to
be ofthe total population. In addition, the gap between the information produced by the
U.S. government and migration-related institutions and the estimates given by Ethiopian
organizations is huge. The overall size ofthe Ethiopian community in the United States
has been estimated to be approximately 73,000 Ethiopian-born residents; if second and
subsequent generations are included, the total rises to 460,000.2 According to the
Migration Study Policy Institute, a clearinghouse on migration information in the United
States, there were 87,543 Ethiopians in total living in the United States as of 2002.
However, members ofthe Ethiopian Community and leaders in the Washington, DC area
estimate that there are 150,000 to 200,000 Ethiopians in the Washington, DC
metropolitan area alone. There is no truly reliable demographic survey of all Ethiopians
living in the United States; as a result, all figures are contested and no sampling frame
exists for the selection of a strict random sample. Hence, the survey is constrained from
providing any broad-based inferences. The findings of this research, therefore, are
limited to the opinions ofthe respondents to the survey, but it allows one to obtain basic
data and trends regarding the study at hand.
2. Terrence Lyons, "A Conflict Generated Diaspora and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia,"
Conflict, Security & Development 7, no. 4 (2007): 529-549.
3. Migration Policy Institute Database, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/regionalstudygroup/
(accessed December 25,2013).
CHAPTER V
PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS
The purpose ofthis chapter is to present the findings ofthe study in order to
describe and explain the political motivations and methods of involvement among the
Ethiopian Diaspora in the United States to influence the political process of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE).
Demographic Data
This section of the study provides a profile ofthe study respondents. Descriptive
statistics were used to analyze the following: age group, gender, marital status, religion,
education, annual income, ethnicity, self-identification, place of birth, years lived in
United States, and U.S. citizenship. A profile of migration activity also discussed the
following: reason for migration, initial migration destination, years in initial destination,
last time the participants went back home and whether the United States was the first
choice oftheir migration choice.
A sample population of 330 Ethiopians (i.e., surveys completely and
appropriately filled out) located in the United States was included in the study. The
survey results were collected from the different venues in Atlanta, the ESFNA Soccer
tournament held at the World Congress Center, and on line.
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As indicated in Table 1, the typical respondent ofthe study was a male
Ethiopian between 40 to 50 years old who was married and was an Orthodox Christian.
The typical respondent was a college graduate with an annual income ofup to $50,000
who indicated Amhara as his/her ethnicity. Compared to the general population of
Ethiopia, the number ofwomen in Ethiopia is slightly higher than the number ofmen,
which is close to 52 percent ofthe population. While the number of Orthodox Christians
among the respondents is the highest, this is similar to the percentage of Orthodox
Christians among the general population in Ethiopia. Although the typical respondent
was born in urban Ethiopia, he/she held U.S. citizenship and has lived in the United
States for up to fifteen years. Although the United States was the first choice ofthe
migration destination, the typical respondent indicated another African country as the
actual initial destination. Hence, the majority of the respondents are here in the U.S. as a
result of secondary migration. Political and educational reasons were indicated as the
main reasons for migration. The last trip home to Ethiopia has been as long as five years
for the typical respondent.
As indicated in Table 1,200 of the respondents (60.6%) are in the 40 - 59 age
groups and 111 of the respondents (33.6%) are in the 21-39 years range. This is similar
to the age profile of Ethiopian refugees and immigrants in the United States, which
indicates that the majority are between 20-45 years old.1
1. Solomon Addis Getahum, The History ofEthiopian Immigrants andRefugees in America,
1900-2000: Patterns ofMigration, Survival andAdjustment (New York: LFB Scholarly Publishers, 2007),
111-115.
































































































































































There were only eight respondents under 20 and 11 respondents above 60. The
age distribution is important because one can tell that at least the majority ofthem have
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passed through and been politically socialized under the military regime, which ruled
Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991.
In terms of education, a large majority (89.7%) of the respondents had at least
some level of college education, or even post-graduate education. The literacy rate in
Ethiopia is 39.0%, which shows a greater degree of concentration ofthe educated
segment of the population outside of Ethiopia.2 This is also interesting because it relates
to a recent comparison of2000 census data at the Mumford Center, State ofUniversity of
New York at Albany. According to the comparison, black immigrants from Africa
averaged the highest educational attainment of any population groups in the country,
including Whites and Asians.3 Analysis ofthe 2000 census data confirms the fmding
too. "According to the 2000 US Census, more than 95% of Africans aged 25 and over
have completed high school and more. The figure for the high school completion rate for
the foreign born from Asia, Europe, and South America is 83.8 %, 81.3% and 79.6%,
respectively."4 These finding shed light on the intensity ofthe issue of brain drain from
developing countries in general and Ethiopia, in particular.
A majority of respondents 316 (96%), both men and women identified themselves
primarily as Ethiopian as opposed to ethnic or religious identity. It is interesting to see
such a response from the majority of the respondents at a time when ethnic identity is
being used by some as the basis ofpolitics in the Diaspora as well as back in Ethiopia.
2. World Fact Book CIA. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos
/ethtml (accessed December 27,2013).
3. The Phora Database, "Africans Most Educated Immigrant," http://www.thephora.net/forum/
archive/index.php/t-51250.html (accessed December 27,2013).
4. Getahum, The History ofEthiopian Immigrants, 112.
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This finding is confirmed with the response given to the question, Are you a member
ofan ethnic-based organization(s): 60.4% ofthe respondents said that they are not a
member ofany ethnic based organization. The recent trend among Ethiopians in the
United States is to return to Ethiopia for visits. This is also the trend among the
respondents, 64.4% ofthem have at least gone back home during the last five years.
Such visitation is made possible by the easing ofthe current Ethiopian government's
restriction on travel. The majority ofthe respondents (70%) have become United States
citizens, which made traveling to Ethiopia easier and less risky.
The continued affinity is attested here. Visiting one's home country may be an
indicator of the attachment and yearning to remain in contact. Similarly, affinities to
one's place ofworship may be another indication of attachment to one's country of
origin. A large number ofthe respondents, 35.6%, attend service every week, while
45.8% attend occasionally. Hence, religion, especially the Ethiopian Orthodox Church,
may be a strong indication of attachment to one's country of origin. Most of the
respondents who attend places of worship are Orthodox Christian (79.1%), while others
attend Protestant, Muslim, and Catholic places of worship. Only two respondents belong
to the Jewish faith, while 5.8% chose to mark other. The number of Ethiopian churches
has recently increased, serving mainly the residents of the Ethiopian community. The
increase is also attributed partly to the political division that permeates the religious life
ofthe Diaspora. For instance, back in the early 1990s, there was only one Ethiopian
Orthodox Church serving the Atlanta community. Ever since then, churches are being
opened along political lines. Groups that are opposed to the current EPRDF government
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and the Ethiopian Holy Synod have created their own churches under the exiled Synod
recognizing Abuna Merkorios, the deposed patriarch of Ethiopia as a legitimate head of
the church. On the other hand, those who support the government and the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church Holy Synod in Ethiopia have established their own churches.
Supporters ofthe government and the Holy Synod in Ethiopia are mostly from Tigrai,
while the majority of the supporters ofthe exiled Synod are Amhara. For instance, there
are two churches named after St. Mary, and two churches named after St. Gabriel in
Atlanta. The division and infighting is entrenched across the United States, in all the
localities where the Ethiopian Diaspora is said to be living. Some argue that due to the
institutionalization of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, followers ofthe Ethiopian Orthodox
Church are based on ethnicity.5 However, it is very hard to argue that the membership or
congregations of the respective churches are entirely formed strictly along ethnic lines.
There may be a handful of fanatics who wish to promote ethnic politics.
As shown from Table 2, most Ethiopians (29.7%) ofthe respondents attributed
politics as their reason for migration, followed by education (28.1%), and the DV Lottery
program (15%). Family reunion or marriage were also given as a reason for migration by
9.5% ofthe respondents, while 7.6 % gave other reasons for migration and 2.4% ofthe
respondents mentioned employment as a reason for migration. Religion was at the
bottom ofthe list as a reason for migration with 1.5%. Looking at the gender difference,
men (69%) are the majority ofthe migrants compared to women at 30.3%; men are the
majority in all three instances—24.8% political migrants, 17% educational migrants, and
11.9% DV Lottery recipients.
5. Getahun, The History ofEthiopian Immigrants, 109.
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As shown in Table 3,48% ofthe respondents never participated in Ethiopian politics,
while 81% rarely participate in Ethiopian politics. On the other hand, 17.3% ofthe
respondents often participate in Ethiopian politics and only 5.3% of the respondents
participate in Ethiopian politics always, thus, indicating a lower level of political
participation among all the respondents.








































































The majority ofthe respondents 171(60.4%) are in the 40 - 59 age group and
compared to the other groups hold the first place (4.2%) in the percentage of people
always participating in Ethiopian politics followed by the 21-39 age group. Respondents
in this group make up 34.3% ofthe respondents and the majority ofthem (27.9%) rarely
or never participate in Ethiopian politics. Political participation is even nonexistent with
the under-20 age group. This confirms the contention that transnational political
engagement is largely a one-generation phenomenon.6 Hence, the younger respondents
are mostly apathetic and uninvolved in Ethiopian politics.
As shown in Table 4,48.8% of the respondents, 28% men and 20.5% women never
participated in Ethiopian politics, while 21.2 % men and 7.4 % women rarely participate
in Ethiopian politics. It is only 5.3% ofthe respondents that claimed to have always
participated in Ethiopian politics and these are all men. Hence, men are much more
likely to participate in politics than women. Although not explicitly stated, politics is
mostly viewed as a male activity. Even back home, with the exception of few women,
they are not equally engaged in the political arena.






































6. Alejandro Portes, "Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant
Transnationalism," Global Networks: A Journal ofTransnational Affairs 1, no. 3 (2001): 181-193.
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Culture and religion contribute to women's social marginalization and limited
access to resources, services and political power. As in other traditional societies, a
woman's role is mostly in the domestic arena.
The percentage of Orthodox Christians is the highest among the respondents
(78.4%), even much higher compared to the percentage of Orthodox Christians among
the general population in Ethiopia (43.5%).7 Compared to the other religious groups, the
percentage of Orthodox Christians participating in Ethiopian politics is higher, 12.4%
participate often, while 4.6% claim to always participate in Ethiopian politics. However,
among the Orthodox Christians, the percentage of respondents that do not completely
participate is much higher at 37.8% than those that participate and even combined with
those that rarely participate 61.5%, brings the number of participants significantly lower.
Political participation is also much lower among the Muslims, Catholic, Protestant, and
Jewish respondents as a percentage. In addition, political participation was similarly low
among the respondents that did mark their religion as other (see Table 5).
The diverse population of Ethiopia seems to be represented here. The Oromo
ethnic group is the largest in Ethiopia at 33.8%, followed by the Amhara 26.9%, Somali
6.2%, and Tigre 6.1%. However, in this survey, the Amhara makes the largest group at
52.9%, followed by those who claim mixed identity 21.6%, Oromo 7.6%, and Gurage
7.2%.
7. World Fact Book CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
(accessed February 29, 2013).
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Table 5. Religion and Political Participation
How often do you participate in Ethiopian Politics?
Orthodox Christian Muslim Catholic Protestant





















































































Overall 48% ofthe respondents claimed never to have participated in Ethiopian
politics, while 28.8% claimed to have participated rarely. Conversely, its only 5.4% of
the respondents that claimed to have participated always and 16.9% that participated
often. As a percentage of their respective group, the Amhara's have a highest percentage
of respondents engaged in politics, followed by the respondents that claimed to have a
mixed identity. However, regardless of ethnicity, transnational political activity is
undertaken by a small minority (see Table 6).
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The conventional claim is that participation in political activities increases as the
educational level of respondents rises. The more educated a person is, he/she will also
possess greater information about government and politics; and are more likely to possess
a higher incidence of feelings ofpolitical efficacy. On the other hand empirical
literature on political participation shows that higher education is a proxy for pre-adult
experiences and influences, not a cause ofpolitical participation.9 Therefore, the
predictive role of education is ambiguous. Educated and informed, people may have
8. M. Lai Goel, "The relevance of Education for Political Participation in a Developing Society,"
Comparative Political Studies 3 (October 1970): 333-346.
9. Cindy D. Kam and Carl L. Palmer, "Reconsidering the Effects ofEducation on Political
Participation," The Journal ofPolitics 70, no. 3 (July 2008): 612-631.
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various reasons to participate or not to participate depending on a number of factors.
The majority ofthe respondents with some college education 12.7%, respondents with
college education 30.7%, and respondents with postgraduate education 25.1%, almost
70% rarely or never participate in Ethiopian politics (see Table 7). Many ofthe
respondents attribute their apathy due to lack of trust, power rivalry, and infighting.
Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller, also emphasize another aspect of the contradiction in the
literature with regard to immigrants. Educated immigrants would be significantly
inclined to shift allegiances and transfer their energies and interest toward their new
countries.10 The same authors cite another study that point out that, individuals who
were already interested or active in the politics of their home countries, continued these
interests even after migrating; therefore, higher education would lead to an increase in
transnationalism.11 Nonetheless, as the data show, the majority of the people in this study
are not actively engaged in Ethiopian politics.
Political scientists argue that political participation is positively correlated with
income. Robert A. Dahl finds in his community study an equally clear increase of
general political participation with an increase in income.12 However, the findings in
this study indicate that there is a lower level of participation among the high-income
groups.
10. Luis Eduardo Guarzino, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller, "Assimilation and
Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants,"
American Journal ofSociology 108, no. 6 (May 2003): 1211-48.
11. Ibid.
12. Robert A Dahl, Political Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1971), 257.
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Compared to the $21-$50k group, in which 2.5% ofthe respondents always
participate in politics, only 1.8% of the respondents in the $51-$100k group, and (.7%) of
the respondents in the $100k plus group claim to have always participated in Ethiopian
politics. The data also show the same trend with the percentage of respondents that claim
to have participated often in politics. Only 7.8% of respondents in the $21-$50 group
claim to have often participated in Ethiopian politics, while the responses are 4.9% and
.7% ofthe $51-$100k and $100k-plus groups, respectively; thus showing a decrease in
political participation as income level rises (see Table 8).
100






























































































The primary reason for the migration ofmany Africans, including Ethiopians to
America is political repression.13 As shown in Table 9, political reason holds the first
place in terms of reason for migration at 29.4%, followed by education 27.0% and the
DV lottery program at 16.7%. It should be noted that the political refugees/economic
migrant categories are blurred because ofthe inseparability ofeconomic and political
reasons for departure.
13. Solomon Addis Getahun, Multicultural America: An Encyclopedia ofthe Newest Americans
(Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 657-701.
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Comparatively speaking, asylum application due to political reasons gives one a
better chance ofbeing accepted in the United States. This may have been one ofthe main
reasons why we have more respondents claiming to have political reasons for migration.
In addition, those who migrated for political reason have the highest percentage of
respondents claiming to participating always (3.5%) and (7.1%) participating often in
Ethiopian politics. Overall, the degree of participation is the lowest for almost all the
different categories.
In the study of Salvadoran, Dominican, and Colombian immigrants, it was
demonstrated that length of residence in the United States does not reduce interest or
involvement in home country politics but actually increases it.14 Along the same line,
although they are more politically connected and economically endowed, it is clearly
14. Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller, "Assimilation and Transnationalism," 1238-1239.
102
viewed how the Irish in America or the Jews, have played a sustained vital role in
mobilizing support to their respective homeland.
However, in this study, it was observed that overall there is a low rate ofpolitical
participation across the board regardless of duration of stay; 48% of all the respondents
claim to have never participated, while 28% claim to have rarely participated. Only 5.4%
ofthe respondents claimed to have always participated in Ethiopian politics (see Table
10).








































































The majority ofrespondents (almost 70%) are United States citizens. Out ofthe
70%, 34.4% never participate in Ethiopian politics, while 20.9% participate rarely.
Becoming a naturalized citizen confers rights, privileges and benefits including the right
to vote. It also gives one the opportunity to influence politics of the home country. This
is especially true if the receiving government's political agenda aligns with that ofthe
Diaspora group among other things (see Table 11).
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Given the current political environment, it may be hard for the opposition to play
a critical role in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia. This is mainly due to the
current warm relationship between the government of Ethiopia and the U.S. due to the
American government's global agenda of fighting terrorism.
The majority ofthe respondents (97.1%) are not members of an ethnic-based
organization(s), and 47.9% ofthese never participate in Ethiopian politics while 28.6%
rarely participate in Ethiopian politics. The number of respondents that claimed to be a
member of an ethnic based organization(s) is insignificant. However, ethnic solidarity as
a political force and is not a new phenomenon (see Table 12).













































Ethnic groups play a critical economic, political and social role among the
Diaspora. New communication technologies have improved abilities to mobilize, and
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multiculturalism policies in receiving countries have revitalized ethnic pride and
assertiveness.15
Political Motivations
Political motivation in this context is defined as the willingness to expend energy,
and resources in pursuit of a wide range of political goals. Motivation is also viewed as
an essential precursor to political participation. Therefore, in order to understand
participation in transnational politics or the lack of it, first we need to find out the
determinants of involvement or as to why respondents are lacking any affect for political
action.
Although far away from their original home, the Ethiopian Diaspora is part of the
sending country as much as it is part of the receiving country. Ethiopians are also a small
percentage ofthe U.S. population, but their numbers are steadily growing from a few
Ethiopians that begun to arrive here mainly for education to the multitude of Ethiopians
that have made the U.S. their second home away from home. They are also a remarkably
diverse population, representing several ethnicities, religion, and languages. There may
be various factors that motivate people to make a conscious decision to participate or not
participate in the politics of their home country. Therefore, given the multiplicity, it is
important to identify the motivation for and impediments to political action.
Of the male respondents, 22.5% and 4.3% ofthe female respondents, which is a total
of26.8% of all the respondents, strongly disagree with the statement that it is pointless to
be active in Ethiopian politics, and 26.4% ofmen and 13.8% ofwomen disagree with the
15. Steven Vertovec, "The Political Importance ofDiasporas," http://www.migration
information.org (accessed March 14,2013).
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statement. In other words, a combined majority of 67% do not agree with the notion
that it is pointless to be active in Ethiopian politics. On the other hand, 16.4% ofmen
and 4.0% ofwomen strongly disagree and 23.7% ofmen and 8.8% ofwomen disagree
with the notion that they are busy to be engaged in Ethiopian politics. Thus, a slight
majority ofthem (52.9 %) believe that they are not too busy to be engaged in Ethiopian
politics. Only 7.3% ofmen, 1.5% ofwomen, 15.8% ofmen, and 2.6% ofwomen, atotal
of 27.1%, that respectively strongly agree and agree with being active or engaged in
Ethiopian politics. Yet 26.6% ofmen and 12.0 % ofwomen agree, and 19.7% ofmen
and 4.4% of women strongly agree (a total of 62.8%) agree with the statement that
political activism is an effective method of developing Ethiopia. However, 72.9 % of
these respondents are not actively engaged in Ethiopian politics (see Table 13).
Table 13. Responses to Political Motivation Statements 1-4
Male Female Total
No. % No. % No. %
It is pointless to be active in Ethiopian Politics.
Strongly Disagree 62 22.5%
Disagree 73 26.4%
Agree 45 16.3%
Strongly Agree 17 6.2%
I am too busy to be engaged in Ethiopian Politics.
Strongly Disagree 45 16.4%
Disagree 65 23.7%
Agree 73 26.6%
Strongly Agree 13 4.7%
I am active or engaged in Ethiopian Politics.
Strongly Disagree 59 21.6%
Disagree 72 26.4%
Agree 43 15.8%
Strongly Agree 20 7.3%
Political activism is an effective method of developing Ethiopia,
Strongly Disagree 25 9.1%
Disagree 44 16.1%
Agree 73 26.6%



































































As shown in Table 14,21.9% ofmen and 10.0% women strongly disagree
with the notion that the current government deserves political support and 26.4% ofmen
and 9.7% ofwomen and disagree with that statement.
Table 14. Responses to Political Motivation Statements 5-12
Male
No. %



























































































































































































































































































































Ofthe respondents, 68% are somehow opposed to the current government and
agree that the current government does not deserve political support. Also, 24.9% ofmen
and 9.3% ofwomen strongly agree that the government deserves to be politically
opposed, while 27.1% of men and 12.6% ofwomen agree that it deserves to be opposed;
therefore, 74% ofthe respondents believe that the government deserves political
opposition. In addition, 22.8% men and 7.0% ofwomen and 20.6% ofmen and 10.7% of
women respectively, a total of 61.1 %, do not believe that their voice matters on how
Ethiopia is governed. Also, a total of 60.3 % of the respondents, 27.2% and 33.1%
somehow strongly agree and agree that the government does not value their opinion.
They are implying that it is not a democratic government and also believe that political
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activism is an effective method of change, yet the majority ofthem (56.8%) have
chosen not to engage in politics to bring political change in Ethiopia.
Methods of Participation
It is important to look closely at the definition and operationalisation of political
participation. It is a complicated task, because the definition ofpolitical participation has
changed a lot and has become almost a study of everything political.16 It is also argued
that a scholar chooses the definition of political participation in relation to his or her
normative starting point. The most used perspective is the one used by Verba and Nie:
"Political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that aim to influence
the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or then-
choices."17 However, those more interested in non-electoral forms ofpolitical
participation have defined political participation as all voluntary activities by individual
citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various
levels ofpolitical system.18 Hence, in this context, participation refers to the non-
electoral form of political participation.
It must also be noted that the Ethiopian Diaspora is not politically constituted by
the Ethiopian government to fully and directly engage in the electoral politics ofEthiopia.
Therefore, it is not acknowledged to be part ofthe political system and also not in the
16. Jan W. van Deth, Studying Political Participation: Towards A Theory of Everything?"
Measuring & Studying Political Participation—Different Methods, Problems, Solutions, ed. Katrina Uba
Karlstad (Vienna, Austria: Institute for Social Research and Analysis, 2005), 4.
17. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America, Political Democracy and Social
Equity (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1972), 1-3.
18. Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, and Klaus R. Allerbeck, Political Action: Mass Participation
in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 19-23.
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position to take part in those activities directly meant to affect the choice of
government or policy. However, the actions of the segment ofthe Diaspora that choose
to participate in non-electoral forms ofpolitical participation are still indirectly meant to
influence the government and politics of Ethiopia. Hence, non-electoral methods of
participation such as attending meetings, rallies, donating money, attending political
forums are some examples of the methods under taken by some ofthe respondents of the
survey to impact the political process in Ethiopia.
The majority ofthe respondents do not seem to be actively participating in the
political activities listed above. Of all the activities listed, joining a political group is the
most abhorred activity or method ofparticipation, 26.2% ofmen and 10.9% ofwomen
respectively strongly disagree, while 33.0% men and 14,2% ofwomen disagree with the
idea ofjoining organizations for political purpose. Therefore, 84.3% of the respondents
do not want to join political organizations of any kind. Also, 22.3% men and 10.4% of
women strongly disagree and 30.9% ofmen and 12.6% ofwomen disagree, with the idea
of boycotting or supporting businesses for political reasons. Therefore, a total of 76.2 %
of respondents do not support the idea at all.
Joining political forums or discussion groups is also viewed as the least popular
activity among the respondents, 17.5% ofmen and 10.1% ofwomen strongly disagree,
and 31.7% ofmen and 15.3% ofwomen disagree with the idea ofjoining internet
political forums, which brings the total to 74.6%. Contacting U. S. Officials or
lawmakers with regard to Ethiopian issues is also one of the least supported ideas. A
total of 70.6% of the respondents, 16.9% men and 9.0% women strongly disagree, while
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29.7% ofmen and 15.0% ofwomen disagree with the idea. Donating money or
raising funds for political activity is another least popular activity with 69.4% of the
respondents against it. A total of 17.7% men and 10.7% women strongly disagree, while
28.8% ofmen and 12.2% ofwomen disagree with the idea. Attending political meeting
and rallies is another least popular idea with 65.3% of the respondents objecting to it. If
you look at the break down ofthe total, 15.9% ofmen and 11.1% ofwomen strongly
disagree and 26.9% ofmen and 11.4% ofwomen disagree, thus not supporting the idea of
attending political meetings and rallies. The response to a similar question was almost
the same.
A total of 64.7% ofrespondents, out ofwhich 17.5% ofmen and 10.0% of
women strongly disagree and 25.3% ofmen and 11.9 % ofwomen disagree with the idea
ofparticipating in political demonstrations to bring change in Ethiopia. Signing petitions
to impact politics in Ethiopia may not be the least popular compared with the methods
discussed so far. However, it is not well supported by the majority ofthe respondents. A
total of 57.1%, which is 15.6% men and 10.0% of women strongly disagree, while 20.0%
men and 11.5% women disagree with the idea.
On the other hand, the least costly or the most peripheral methods of
participations have the most support among the respondents. For instance, seeking
political news on Ethiopia is supported by 56.7% ofthe respondents. A total of22.1%
men and 2.2% ofwomen strongly agree, while 24.6% ofmen and 7.7% ofwomen agree
with the statement. Moreover, engaging in discussions on Ethiopian politics with close
friends and family is a highly supported method ofparticipation. A total of 75.5 % ofthe
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respondents, ofwhich 24.8% men and 3.7% women strongly agree and 33.3% ofmen
and 13.7% ofwomen agree with the statement
Table 15 shows that an overwhelming majority of respondents, 34.3% of men and
13.7% ofwomen, strongly support and 23.2% ofmen and 9.2% ofwomen (80.4%) agree
that peaceful struggle can bring about genuine change. This statement is confirmed if
one also looks at the 75.4% disagreement rate on the notion that armed struggle can bring
about genuine change.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Responses to Open-Ended Questions
Section III of the survey consists of four open-ended questions. These questions
were designed to give respondents the opportunity to further explain themselves in detail
with regard to factors of motivation and methods of participation.
1. What are your main reasons for not participating in Ethiopian politics?
The answers to this question produced some interesting patterns. The main
recurring theme revolves around political organizations in the Diaspora, their leadership
and the political culture. The majority of the respondents do not believe that there is a
strong and feasible opposition. One recurring remark was, "All political parties are
fighting for their own power, they do not have clear and defined objectives and they do
not know what they are doing."
In terms ofthe leadership, most respondents commented that (1) they do not trust
politicians, (2) they do not see strong leadership, (3) the leaders have questionable
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motives, (4) they are not truthful, (5) they are motivated by their selfish interest, (6)
they are self-centered, (7) they are divisive, (8) they do not fulfill the peoples need, and
(9) there is a lack ofvisionary leaders. Even one respondent went to the extent of saying:
"I want to see a God-fearing leader."
There were some recurring themes that revolved around the issue ofpolitical
culture. Respondents pointed out:
• The lack of culture of respect and listening to each other;
• Diaspora politicians are not matured enough to engage in a civil discussion;
• No middle ground; people are labeled either as Saint or evil;
• Ethiopian politics lack positive attitude; political leaders on all sides speak
about democracy and have not yet fully embraced its principles;
• No tolerance, blind reasoning, hatred and minimum willingness for others
views;
• Disgust in opposition hate politics, African politics is gun politics and not open
minded.
Respondents also listed personal reasons for not participating in politics. They mainly
pointed out "the lack oftime, family and career obligation, busy in school, trying to
survive here, unable to find time, and lack of interest" as some ofthe reasons for not
participating.
It is also worth mentioning here that a couple of respondents pointed out that
"females are relegated to a position of inferiority in our country." Therefore, they felt
that their contribution might not count. Another respondent reiterated the issue by saying
"by not having women politicians our society discourages women from participating."
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2. What are the main reasons that motivated you to participate in Ethiopian
politics?
The majority ofthe respondents believed in political participation in opposition to
the government. Based on their responses, the main reasons for their participations in
opposition to the government is the lack of democracy and rule of law, ethnic politics,
followed by poverty and women's right and the issue of Assab.
Upon assuming power in 1991, the current government decided to organize a
referendum to give the people of Eritrea the opportunity to decide between remaining in
Ethiopia and secession. The referendum took place in 1993, and the new state of Eritrea
was established. By allowing Eritrea to move to independence, Ethiopia became a
landlocked state as the port of Assab was incorporated into Eritrea. Consequently,
respondents pointed out the issue of Assab as the main reason for their opposition:
"Ethiopia is in danger of disintegrating, losing its history, culture and unity." One
respondent referred to Article 39 ofthe Ethiopian constitution used by the late Prime
Minister, Meles Zenawi to favor Eritrea at the expense of Ethiopia leaving the country
land locked. "Ethiopians must fight to regain the port of Assab." Since then, many
Ethiopians as well as the Diaspora have been blaming the fact that Ethiopia is land locked
on the government and have made it a main reason to oppose the EPRDF government.
The respondents mentioned the absence of democracy in Ethiopia as the main
factor that motivates them to participate in Ethiopian politics. "One party rule and
dictatorship, authoritarianism, the lack ofjustice, the absence of free election,
imprisonment, liberating Ethiopia from the current dictators, lack ofthe rule of law, and
lack ofpolitical freedom," were recurring reasons for participation.
116
Respondents also pointed out "ethnic politics promoted by the government,
ethnic favoritism, small ethnic group controlling everything, only pro TPLF people are
benefiting, tribal issues, ethnic policy of divide and rule, eradicate ethnic politics and
bringing national unity, our country fell in the hands of ethno centrists and minority
groups benefiting only the minority" were recurring themes.
Consequently, respondents pointed out the issue ofAssab as the main reason for
their opposition: "Ethiopia is in danger of disintegrating, losing its history, culture and
unity." One respondent referred to Article 39 ofthe constitution used by the late Prime
Minister, Meles Zenawi to favor Eritrea at the expense of Ethiopia leaving the country
land locked. "Ethiopians must fight to regain the port of Assab." Few respondents raised
the issue of poverty and women's rights as a reason for their participation.
Not all respondents were participating in opposition to the government. There
were a few that said that "they (meaning the government) love the people and will stand
for them, I like the change I have seen the last year, I support the government, Ethiopian
government does a lot of good things and the people are happy, and the country is
progressing in all areas, good things are happening."
3. What are the main issues that motivated you to support the government?
Respondents that supported the government lauded it for its economic policy.
They pointed out "the progress in infrastructure development, rural electrification, road
construction, expansion in education as measured by the number ofuniversities and high
schools." They even pointed out that they have witnessed firsthand the progress in
infrastructure, expansion ofroads and compared it to the Derg era. Hence, they believed
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that the government deserves to be supported because of the different initiatives,
relative peace and prosperity and overall economic development. Respondents also
attributed their support "due to the government's strength and organizational skill,
stability, because its action oriented and reminded that the opposition needs to stop blind
opposition and appreciate the positive things done compared to the era ofthe Derg.
Some even commended the government for a relative peace and absence of violence.
The government's effort to build a dam near the source of the Nile is also viewed
positively and was a main source of support. A recent meeting convened by the
government representatives to garner support and raise funds to build a dam in Ethiopia
was attended in Atlanta by a record high number ofmembers of the Ethiopian Diaspora.
4. What are the main issues that motivated you to oppose the government?
Once again those that are motivated to oppose the government attributed their
opposition to the government to the absence of democracy, and to ethnic politics.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The study set out to explore the role ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora in the United
States in the political process in Ethiopia. It also sought to understand what motivates
members of the Ethiopian Diaspora whether or not to participate in the politics oftheir
homeland, identify some ofthe methods of engagement, and contribute to the body of
literature about transnational politics.
According to the respondents in this survey, the absence of democracy, the lack of
political stability, and ethnic politics are some ofthe major factors that led to the
migration ofEthiopians. Democracy has never flourished in many other African
countries as well as in Ethiopia, although the quest for it persists. In Ethiopia, the
struggle for democracy goes back to the regime of Emperor Haile-Selassie. hi the 1960s,
the struggle for democracy was successfully put down by the regime, but not without
planting the seeds of resistance among the population. The expansion ofmodern
education increased the awareness ofthe people. This development aided by the
introduction ofmodern means ofcommunication also opened up the flow of information.
Ethiopia was no longer isolated and therefore the quest for democracy increased. In the
early 1970s, the liberation struggle in Africa, the oil crisis ofthe 1970s and the general
global political dynamics contributed to the political events in Ethiopia. As a result,
Haile-Selassie's hold on power ended.
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A few years after the 1974 revolution, particularly during the Red Terror of
1977-1978, many Ethiopians left the country in huge numbers and those who were
already abroad chose to stay away. This phenomenon was unprecedented in Ethiopia's
long history. As witnessed by the volume of migration out ofthe country, the Derg
regime that overthrew the emperor took more severe and stringent measures against those
who challenged its power. This resulted in the mass migration from Ethiopia. Due to
Cold War political considerations, the United States resettled many refugees languishing
in neighboring countries.
With the collapse of the Derg in 1991, many saw a ray ofhope in terms of
creating a stable Ethiopian polity. However, that dream was short-lived, not long after
the end ofthe Cold War; Ethiopians continued to migrate out of the country due to
political and economic reasons. The U.S. Diversity Visa Program of the Immigration Act
of 1990 which permitted migration of people from countries with low rate of immigration
also provided an additional impetus for migrants from Ethiopia. As immigrants became
U.S. citizens, many sponsored parents and siblings for permanent residency.
Consequently, the number of Ethiopians in the United States continued to grow. Along
with their increase in numbers, Ethiopians also created and expanded the number of
community organizations, self-help groups, and places of worship, realizing the
likelihood of their prolonged stay in the host country.
Apart from these institutions, there are a number ofpolitical groups that are
involved in the politics of Ethiopia. Most are opposed to the current regime and they
share a common denominator of opposition to the EPRDF government and its policies.
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However, there are also groups that are involved in the politics process in Ethiopia
with the aim of supporting the government in power.
According to respondents in the survey, the absence of political stability and
economic issues are major factor for their migration. Most ofthem have also stayed in
another country before they were finally resettled here in the United States. They are
here as a result of secondary migration. The majority of respondents have at least some
level of college education, confirming with the United States census data that African
immigrants have the highest level of high school completion rate compared to other
foreign-born immigrants. This sheds light on the extent ofthe brain drain from Ethiopia.
An overwhelming majority ofthe respondents identified themselves primarily as
an Ethiopian as opposed to their ethnic identity. It was interesting to see such a response
at a time when ethnic identity is used by some to define Ethiopian politics. Most
respondents regularly visit back home attesting their continued affinity. This is also an
indicator of their strong desire to remain connected.
According to the research that assessed political activism among the Ethiopian
Diaspora, most respondents believe in the need to be politically active and involved.
However, they pointed out the inefficiency and incompetence ofthe opposition's
leadership, as well as the lack ofvision, the absence ofdemocracy within the opposition
as well, mistrust and the prevalence ofhate politics as some of the main reasons that
deterred them from participating in Ethiopian politics. The crux of the problem
according to the respondents is the lack of a democratic tradition among Ethiopian
politicians.
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The majority of respondents that chose to participate in transnational politics
chose to limit their participation to peripheral activities such as following up the news,
discussions of political and economic news with family and friends. These are less
committed methods ofparticipation. More committed forms of participations such as
being a member of a political organization, raising funds, or advocacy or are not
supported by most of the respondents.
The lack ofparticipation is much more evident among the younger generation
under the age of twenty. Men are also more likely to participate in politics compared to
women. One wonders if this was because politics is viewed as male activity.
According to the survey, an overwhelming majority of the respondents are
opposed to armed struggle and believe in peaceful methods of struggle to bring
meaningful change in the Ethiopian political system. This is contrary to the general
assumption that "Diaspora groups created by conflict tend to compromise less and
exacerbate the protracted nature of conflicts."1 This assumption may be true with regard
to the few that are actively engaged in transnational political participation; hence, it must
be qualified.
The majority of respondents are Orthodox Christians and most ofthem participate
in politics. However, political participation is much lower as a percentage among those
who identified themselves as Muslims.
As indicated, the majority of the respondents are opposed to the government.
Nevertheless, a significant number of respondents also lauded the government for its
1. Terrance Lyons, "A Conflict Generated Diaspora & Transnational Politics in Ethiopia,"
Conflict, Security & Development 7, no. 4 (2007): 529-549.
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economic policy: infrastructure development, rural electrification, expansion of
education as measured by the number of higher institute of learning as well as the grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Capitalizing on the good will, facilitating a greater interaction between the
Ethiopian state and the Diaspora will definitely have a positive impact on the future of
the country. The government must do more in politically empowering and engaging the
Diaspora. Although not all countries are eager to embrace their Diaspora, a large number
of countries are actively involved in constituting sections of their Diaspora as not just as
part of a larger deterritorialized nation, but a new constituency that is connected to, and
has claims on the institutional structures ofthe state.2
Despite the increasing number of Ethiopians becoming American citizens,
Ethiopians do not seem to be influential enough to affect the policy ofthe United States
towards the current regime. However, the struggle to influence U.S. policy continues as a
result ofthe few Ethiopians and Ethiopian Americans who are trying to assert their views
by organizing demonstrations, rallies and even contacting lawmakers. Based on this
research, one can conclude that the leadership of most opposition groups must revisit
their strategy, leadership style and work hard to introduce the culture of democracy if
they are to mobilize the majority.
The literature on transnational politics indicates that Diaspora transnational
activities pose a challenge to the state. However, the findings ofthis research indicate
that the majority of the Ethiopian Diaspora are not engaged in core transnational political
2. Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 5.
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activities. Although the legal and political framework in the United States is
conducive for political activism, power struggle and internal disunity has contributed to
the minimal level of engagement.
This descriptive and exploratory study has offered an evaluative perspective on
transnational political activity of the Ethiopian Diaspora and was conducted using a
nonprobability sample of Ethiopians in the United States. As a direct consequence ofthis
methodology, the study encountered a number of limitations that need to be considered.
One ofthe limitations is that the sample is not representative ofthe population and the
results of this study are constrained from providing any broad-based inferences. Future
research could supplement it by surveying a larger representative sample and using
interviewing and focus groups to get an in depth understanding ofthe Ethiopian
Diaspora. Such a broader study will have a positive contribution for developing the
capacity and potential of the Diaspora in becoming a more significant transnational force.
It is important to mobilize the financial resources, transnational networks and human
capital ofthe sizeable number ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora residing in the U.S. for the




What is your current age?
□18-25 D26-35
□ 60 +








4. What is your Ethnicity
5. What is your education level? □ High School □ Some College
□ Graduate □ Post Graduate
6. Did you come directly from Ethiopia? □ Yes □ No
If your answer is no, please go to question #9
7. If not, where was your first destination out of Ethiopia?
8. How long did you leave in your first country of destination?
9. When did you come to the USA?
10. How long have you lived in the USA? DO-10 years □ 11-20 years
□ 21 - 30 years □ 30 plus
11. Why did you come to the USA? □ Seeking educational opportunity
□ Professional Opportunity □ Political Asylum
12. What is your immigration status? □ Illegal □ Asylee □ Permanent resident
□ Nat citizen □ Workers visa □ Student visa
13. Have you gone back to Ethiopia, if so for what reason?
14. Do you consider yourself interested in the political process in Ethiopia?
□ Yes □ No
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15. Would you say that you are □ Very much interested
□ Somewhat interested □ Not interested at all
16. Ifyou are interested, in what form do you get involved in the politics ofback home?
□ Follow political news online □ Participate in online political discussion
□ Read newspapers □ Attend political meetings and contribute or
raise funds
□ Discuss politics with friends and family volunteer
□ Involve in advocacy work □ Attempt to influence U.S. political office
holders and leaders
16. How often do you follow political news online or participate in online political
discussion? D A great deal □ Very little □ None
17. How much attention do you pay to political news from and about Ethiopia?
□ A great deal III Very little DNone
18. Do you ever discuss politics with your family or friends? □ Yes D No
19. How often do you discuss politics with your family or friends?
□ Every day □ 3 or 4 times a week □ Less often
20 Do you participate in politics in support ofthe government or opposition groups?
□ Yes □ No
21. How did you come to the USA? D As a tourist □ Political interest and
participation in general
22. Do you consider yourself interested in politics and/or community affairs?
□ Yes, very much □ Yes, to some extent □ Only a little
□ Not really □ Not at all
23. Which education do you have (please mark the highest level attained)?
□ None, or grades 1-8 □ Some High school (grades 9-11)
□ High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate)
□ Business, Technical, or vocational school AFTER high school
□ Some college, no 4-year degree
□ College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree)
□ Post-graduate training/professional school after college (Master1 degree/Ph.D.,
Law or Medical school)
□ Don't know/Refused
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24. What is your ZIP code?
25. Have you actively participated in politics the last 12 months? (check all that apply)
□ Member of/donor to a political party
□ Attended a political party's precinct caucus
□ Candidate for elective office
□ Member of any kind of government or local councils
□ Member of a grassroots organization
□ Attended town meetings, public hearings, citizen activist meetings, etc.
□ Written a letter to the editor
□ Contacted a politician on one or more issues
□ Discussed politics with family, friends or colleagues
□ I voted in the most recent election
□ None
26. Do you consider yourself interested in politics and/or community affairs?
□ Yes, very much
□ Yes, to some extent
□ Only a little
□ Not really
□ Not at all
27. Have you participated in other discussions online? (check all that apply)
□ Yes, on a political party website/e-mail list
□ Yes, on a politicians website/e-mail list
□ Yes, on a political or community organization's website/e-mail list
□ Yes, on a government website/e-mail list
□ Yes, on an individual's website/e-mail list
□ Yes, on a mass media website/e-mail list
□ Yes, on a commercial website/e-mail list
□ Yes, through "usenet" newsgroups
□ Yes, through real-time chat or group instant messaging
□ No, I have not
APPENDIX B
Survey Questions in Amharic
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APPENDIX C
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Data
TITLE 'MOTIVATIONS AND METHODS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA'




















































AGEGRP 'Ql Age Group'
GENDER 'Q2 Gender'
MARITAL 'Q3 Marital Status'
RELIGION 'Q4 Religion'
ETHNIC 'Q5 Ethnicity'
SELFID 'Q6 How do you primarily identify yourself
EDUCAT 'Q7 Present Education'
INCOME 'Q8 Annual Income'
REASON 'Q9 Reason for imgration'
USFIRST 'Q10 The US was my first migration destination'
INITIAL 'Qll Initial Migration Destination'
FIRSTYRS 'Q12 Years lived in migration destination'
USALIVE 'Q13 Years lived in the USA'
BIRTH 'Q14 Place of Birth'
USCITI 'Q15 US Citizenship1
MEMBER 'Q16 Membership in an Ethnic Based Organization'
RELIGRP 'Q17 Religious Group Membership'
PLACE 'Q18 Place of Worship Attendance'
ETHIOPOL 'Q19 Participation in Ethiopian polities'
LASTTIME 'Q20 The last time I went back home'
M0TIV21 'Q21 It is pointless to be active in Ethiopian politics'
MOTIV22 'Q22 I am too busy to be engaged in Ethiopian politics'
MOTIV23 'Q23 I am active or engaged in Ethiopian politcs'






MOTIV28 'Q28 The government does not value in what people like me
think'
MOTIV29 'Q29 I engage in politics to bring economic change in Ethiopia'
MOTIV30 'Q30 I engage in politics to bring political change in
Ethiopia'
M0TIV31 'Q31 I engage in politics to bring ethnic equality'
MOTIV32 'Q32 I engage in politics to bring religious equality'
METH33 'Q33 I attend political meeting or rallies'
I sign petition to impact polities in Ethiopia'
I take part in a demonstration to impact politics in
'Q25 The current government deserves political support'
'Q26 The current government deserves political opposition'












I donate money to raise funds for political purpose'
I boycott or buy for political purposes'
I regularly seek political news on Ethiopia'
I join an internet political forum or discussion group'
Q40 I contact US officals - lawmakers on Ethiopian issues'
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METH41 'Q41 I readily join organizations for political purposes'
METH42 'Q42 I engage in Ethiopian political discussions with close
friends-family'
METH43 'Q43 Peaceful struggle can bring about genuine change'


























































































































































































































































































































AGEGRP GENDER MARITAL RELIGION ETHNIC SELFID EDUCAT INCOME REASON
USFIRST INITIAL FIRSTYRS USALIVE BIRTH USCITI MEMBER RELIGRP PLACE
ETHIOPOL LASTTIME M0TIV21 MOTIV22 MOTIV23 MOTIV24 MOTIV25 MOTIV26
MOTIV27
MOTIV28 MOTIV29 MOTIV30 M0TIV31 MOTIV32 METH33 METH34 METH35 METH36






/VARIABLES AGEGRP GENDER MARITAL RELIGION ETHNIC SELFID EDUCAT INCOME
REASON USFIRST INITIAL FIRSTYRS USALIVE BIRTH USCITI MEMBER RELIGRP
PLACE ETHIOPOL LASTTIME MOTIV21 MOTIV22 MOTIV23 MOTIV24 MOTIV25 MOTIV26
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A study of the Motivations and Methods of Involvement of the Ethiopian Diaspora
in the Political Process in Ethiopia
You are invited to participate in a study that explores the motivation and methods of
involvement ofthe Ethiopian Diaspora in the political process in Ethiopia.
There are no known risks to participants who agree to take part in this research. There are
no known personal benefits to participants who agree to take part in this research.
However, it is hoped that those who participate in the study will help research in the field
ofPolitical Science, Diaspora politics, transnationalilsm, emigre politics and the
Ethiopian Diaspora.
Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any question that you do
not want to answer. If you decide not to take part or skip some ofthe questions it will not
affect you in any way.
All responses to the questionnaires will remain confidential. Participation in this research
is voluntary. If participants have questions about the study, they may contact the principal
investigator-Fasil Cherenet via email @ cherejr@comcast.net or the Department of
Political Science at Clark Atlanta University at 404-880-8718.
My signature below verifies that I have read the statement above and agree to participate
in the research project.
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